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Privately owned lands often undersupply environmental benefits and oversupply 
environmental costs through land use and management decisions. Insights into human 
behavior suggest a range of cognitive biases and nonstandard preferences that offer 
alternative explanations for and, perhaps, strategies to influence landowner behavior. 
People respond to simple changes in context and framing, make inconsistent choices over 
time, and respond to social influence—the opinions and behavior of peers.  
This dissertation applies insights from behavioral science to strategies that seek to 
influence individual decisions that impact the environment, especially related to land 
management. First, I review existing experimental research on behavioral insights to 
influence decisions in six domains that have large environmental externalities. Behavioral 
interventions, including changing the status quo and leveraging social influence, are often 
more effective than simply providing information, but there are few applications to land 
management. Chapter Two maps behavioral insights onto farmers’ plot-level 
conservation decisions that benefit biodiversity. Using a case study from California, 
USA, I find farmers who receive information from their peers are three times more likely 
to adopt practices that support biodiversity than those who do not. Chapter Three tests the 
causal effect of social influence on engaging Vermont forest owners in bird habitat 
conservation. Contrary to results from similar studies in other domains, information about 
peer participation reduced interest in the conservation program. Chapter Four presents 
results from another large-scale field experiment that tested the effect of message framing 
on contributions to water quality in a polluted urban watershed. Participants who read an 
emotional, personal narrative with tenuous connections to nutrient pollution were willing 
to pay more for nutrient runoff-reducing landscaping products than those who read a 
scientific description of nutrient pollution's impacts on ecosystems and surrounding 
communities.  
The findings from these four studies contribute to our understanding of environmentally 
relevant behavior, with implications for privately managed land and the environmental 
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INTRODUCTION 
Privately owned lands often undersupply environmental benefits and oversupply 
environmental costs through land use and management decisions. These market 
failures—externalities, public goods, and the tragedy of the commons—are attributed to 
missing alignment between self-interest and the interests of society (Keohane and 
Olmstead 2007). Strategies to intervene include regulation, incentive-based mechanisms, 
and voluntary programs and education, all meant to change behavior based on an 
economic model of behavior that responds only to costs, benefits, and well-defined 
preferences (Jack, Kousky, and Sims 2008; Dolan et al. 2012). 
A large and growing body of research shows how traditional economic assumptions 
about human behavior, summarized in the ‘rational actor model,’ are incomplete. Simon 
(1955) questioned the external validity of the rational actor model and recognized the 
limitations to human cognitive capacity, or ‘bounded rationality.’ In reality, he argued, 
individuals do not comprehend the full set of possible alternatives, do not have well 
defined, ordered preferences, and do not exercise complex probability computations and 
mapping of all possible outcomes and their values. Over the next half century these 
insights were tested, developed, extended and classified into cognitive biases and 
nonstandard preferences (Madrian 2014). Key implications include the ways in which 
people 1) are sensitive to a decision’s context, or ‘choice architecture’, 2) make errors 
when evaluating risk and uncertainty, 3) care about the present relative to the future, and 
4) care about the behavior and opinions of others (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin 
2004; Thaler and Sunstein 2008).  
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These advances, loosely grouped as ‘behavioral insights,’ have three implications for 
interventions designed to address environmental challenges arising from private land 
management.  
First, cognitive biases can make it difficult to identify the optimal level of conservation 
and the appropriate strategy to intervene. Many environmental policies rely on stated or 
revealed preferences to establish the value of some nonmarket environmental good. Yet, 
there is often a discrepancy between the amount people are willing to pay for an 
environmental good and the amount they are willing to accept for its degradation, a 
difference explained by the ‘endowment effect’ (Croson and Treich 2014; Thaler 2018). 
Moreover, individuals may not always be optimizing their preferences. When people are 
overwhelmed by complexity, pressed for time, or biased towards the present moment, 
their private marginal benefit of taking some action may be more aligned with the social 
optimal than observed behavior would suggest (Madrian 2014). For example, some 
farmers intend to adopt certain management practices but simply fail to follow through, 
even when subsidies are offered (Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson 2011). In these cases, 
changing prices or providing information does not address the primary barrier to 
behavior-change. By correcting for a market failure without addressing the behavioral 
realities of those who are affected by environmental policies, interventions risk creating a 
‘second-best’ solution that does not increase welfare (Benartzi et al., 2017b)(Shogren and 
Taylor 2008). 
Second, existing or conventional behavior-change interventions may be less effective 
when failing to account for behavioral insights. Money—either too much or too little—
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can counteract desired behavior by crowding out intrinsic motivations or setting the 
stakes too high or low (Kamenica 2012). Seemingly minor features of choice 
architecture, such as how information is presented and the status quo, can influence 
whether people choose to enroll in a program (Thaler 2018). And many people have 
‘other-regarding preferences’: their behavior demonstrates that they are not strictly self-
interested and are motivated by cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, and fairness (Bénabou 
and Tirole 2006; Fehr-Duda and Fehr 2016). These features of human behavior could 
inhibit the effectiveness of traditional policy interventions to achieve desired 
environmental outcomes. 
Third, insights from behavioral science offer alternative strategies to influence behavior. 
Recognizing that people respond to more than information and incentives expands the 
suite of behavior-change options available to policymakers (Dolan et al. 2012). ‘Nudges’ 
are “choice-preserving, behaviorally informed approaches to regulatory problems, 
including disclosure requirements, default rules, simplification, and use of salience and 
social norms” (Sunstein 2013, 3). Such non-pecuniary approaches are particularly 
attractive because they tend to be low-cost and allow for individual freedom to guide the 
ultimate decision (Benartzi et al. 2017). Moreover, leveraging other-regarding 
preferences can complement regulatory approaches by employing self-enforcement 
(Ostrom 2000; Shogren, Parkhurst, and Banerjee 2010). 
In recent years, behavioral science has been recognized by governments and institutions 
in the development of social programs (e.g., BehaviouraI Insights Team 2010; World 
Bank 2015; Executive Order No. 13707 2016). By drawing on a more realistic 
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understanding of human behavior, researchers and practitioners have refined the delivery 
of interventions to improve individual and social welfare (Chetty 2015). There is clear 
relevance to and promise for the design of programs and policies to address 
environmental challenges (Fehr-Duda and Fehr 2016, Cinner 2018).  
This dissertation applies insights from behavioral science to strategies that seek to 
influence individual decisions that impact the environment, especially related to land 
management.  
First, I review the literature to collate evidence on behavioral insights for influencing 
decisions that have large environmental externalities. I find that behaviorally informed 
interventions consistently outperform the provision of information in changing behavior, 
but the bulk of research has focused primarily on recycling and energy and water use. 
Very few experimental studies have been conducted on land management and decisions 
that directly impact biodiversity and other environmental goods. 
Next, I consider how four areas of behavioral science—context, risk, time, and social 
influence—might explain farmers’ decisions to increase on-farm biodiversity. Using data 
from a survey of farmers in California, USA, I find evidence that sensitivity to social 
influence is highly correlated with the adoption of practices that benefit wildlife.  
The third and fourth studies are field experiments that test behavioral interventions on 
individual decisions to manage private lands in ways that contribute to environmental 
public goods. In Chapter Three, I find that the provision of information about the 
behavior of peers reduces forest owners’ interest in a bird habitat conservation program. 
In Chapter Four, I find that framing the problem of nutrient pollution in a way that elicits 
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emotion through narrative increases the amount people are willing to pay for landscaping 
products that improve water quality, compared to scientific information about the 
problem. 
These studies demonstrate the potential for behavioral science to inform more effective 
strategies to address environmental challenges, especially those arising from private land 
management.   
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CHAPTER ONE: NUDGING PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR: 
EVIDENCE AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Hilary Byerly1,2,*, Andrew Balmford3, Paul J Ferraro4, Courtney Hammond Wagner1,2, 




Human actions are responsible for many of our greatest environmental challenges. 
Studies from the human behavioral sciences show that minor features of decision settings 
can have major effects on people’s choices. While such behavioral insights have 
positively influenced individual health and financial decisions, less is known about 
whether and how these insights can encourage choices that are better for the environment. 
We review 160 experimental interventions that attempt to alter behavior in six domains 
where decisions have large environmental impacts: family planning, land management, 
meat consumption, transportation choices, waste production, and water use. Claims that 
social influence (norms) and simple adjustments to automatic settings (defaults) can 
influence pro-environmental decisions are supported by the evidence. Yet for other 
interventions, knowledge gaps preclude clear conclusions and policy applications. To 
address these gaps, we identify four opportunities for future research and encourage 
collaboration between scholars and practitioners to embed tests of behavioral 
interventions within environmental programs. 
1Gund Institute for Environment, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT; 2Rubenstein 
School of Environment and Natural Resources, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 
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*(hbyerly@uvm.edu); 3Conservation Science Group, Department of Zoology, University 
of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom; 4Carey Business School and Department of 
Environmental Health and Engineering, Bloomberg School of Public Health and Whiting 
School of Engineering, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD; 5Department of 
Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN 
 
Human behavior is a key determinant of the state of the environment. Individual 
consumption and lifestyle choices contribute significantly to climate change (Dietz et al. 
2009; IPCC 2014), ecosystem conversion and biodiversity loss (Rockström et al. 2009; 
Tilman and Clark 2015), and water scarcity (Wada and Bierkens 2014). These impacts 
are projected to grow with the size and wealth of the global population (Ferrara and 
Serrat 2008). As such, changing human behavior is essential to addressing environmental 
challenges (Fischer et al. 2012; Cowling 2014; Nyborg et al. 2016). 
Non-regulatory policies and programs designed to influence decision making have 
historically been shaped by the economic model of the rational actor. With unbounded 
cognitive power and attention only to private costs and benefits, this actor responds to 
information and incentives. But there is ample evidence that people have pro-social 
attitudes and are not strictly self-interested (Ostrom 2000). Insights from psychology, 
economics and neuroscience further suggest that cognitive constraints and biases play 
important roles in how people make decisions (Simon 1955; Tversky and Kahneman 
1974). 
In fact, people respond not only to incentives, information and persuasion, but also to 
how these interventions are framed and communicated (Kahneman et al. 1991; Kamenica 
2012). Altering the context within which decisions are made can encourage socially 
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desirable behaviors and discourage socially undesirable ones (Figure 1). For example, 
people are motivated to uphold their promises and goals, so asking for commitments 
(written and oral, public and private) may increase the likelihood of certain actions. Other 
behaviors are more likely to follow the status quo, or default setting, in a given situation. 
Choices can be swayed by the identity of the person, or messenger, who suggests the 
behavior change. Communicating social norms, such as expectations or peer 
comparisons, can influence how individuals behave. People also respond to information 
that is made accessible in their mind (via priming) and to which their attention is drawn 
(via salience) (Figure 2). Unlike financial incentives and education, which target 
controlled, conscious deliberation, these contextual variables often moderate behavior 
through automatic, unconscious cognitive processes (Dolan et al. 2012).  
Applications of these insights from behavioral science have shown positive effects on 
individual and social welfare. Changing the context in which choices are presented can 
encourage people to save for retirement (Thaler and Benartzi 2004), make healthier diet 
and lifestyle choices (Downs et al. 2009; Volpp et al. 2011), and participate in socially 
beneficial programs such as organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein 2003). Yet the 
potential of behavioral insights to advance sustainability is unrealized in many 
environmental policies and programs (Clayton et al. 2013; Dietz 2014; Reddy et al. 
2017).  
There is evidence that interventions targeting these contextual variables can improve 
recycling rates and reduce energy use (see Panel 1 for an overview), but less is known 
about whether such approaches can influence other environmentally significant 
  11 
behaviors. We review the experimental evidence on behavior-change interventions in six 
other domains where individual decisions have large environmental impacts (hereafter, 
“domains”): family planning, land management, meat consumption, transportation 
choices, waste production, and water use. For each of these six domains, we evaluate the 
effectiveness of eight sets of behavioral interventions (hereafter, “interventions”; Figure 
3). Six of these sets aim to affect the contextual variables described above: commitments, 
defaults, messenger, norms, priming, and salience. We contrast these contextual 
interventions with two sets of traditional behavioral interventions, which target the cost-
benefit calculations of rational decision makers: financial incentives and education. These 
traditional interventions set the performance benchmark against which contextual 
interventions can be compared—a comparison that allows us to draw conclusions on the 
full suite of behavior-change options available to policymakers and those designing 
conservation programs. 
We seek to answer three policy-relevant questions. First, what do we know about using 
contextual interventions to change environmentally significant behavior? Second, are 
there interventions that have proven effective across domains? Last, how should we 
prioritize further research on behavioral science to address environmental challenges? 
Methods 
We conducted a systematic literature review to examine the effects of contextual 
interventions on pro-environmental behavior in six environmentally relevant domains 
(Figure 3). We confined our review to studies that employed experimental designs in 
order to draw conclusions about the causal impact of interventions on behavior. Our 
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review was guided by four criteria: (i) experiments that (ii) study pro-environmental 
behavior changes (iii) with respect to our six domains and (iv) report statistical 
inferences. By “experiment,” we mean empirical designs in which exposure to a 
condition/treatment is experimentally manipulated across or within subjects to permit 
unbiased causal inference. By “behavior changes,” we mean self-reported or observed 
behaviors, rather than knowledge, attitudes, or intentions. The behaviors of interest in 
each domain were those that mitigate negative environmental impacts, such as using 
contraception to reduce population growth, regardless of whether the intent of the 
experimenter was environmentally motivated. We identified search terms within each of 
these domains (see WebTable 1) and used them in combination with the words 
experiment, intervention, treatment, control, behavior, sustainable, and pro-
environmental, and with our eight behavior-change interventions: commitments, defaults, 
messenger, norms, priming, salience, financial incentives, and education. Searches were 
conducted in Web of Science, PsycINFO, Econlit, other electronic databases, relevant 
journals, and the citations of included papers. Our search centered on the peer-reviewed 
literature, though we also included working papers from active researchers in the field. 
The studies that met our criteria were coded according to domain, behavior, sampled 
population, sample size, setting (field or lab), measure (reported or observed), 
intervention target, intervention tested, and significance of each treatment. We report our 
results using the instance of a single intervention as the unit of analysis. By intervention, 
we are referring to a treatment and its measured impact on a unique behavioral outcome. 
For experiments that measured multiple behavioral outcomes (eg used contraception and 
reduced sexual activity), each behavior counted separately. Two authors independently 
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coded each study (81% agreement) and discrepancies were reconciled through 
discussion. The full set of reviewed studies can be seen in WebTable 2. 
We aim to give the reader a broad survey of multiple domains and interventions, and thus 
our review is circumscribed in several dimensions. First, we do not report study effect 
sizes or weight the studies by quality. The outcome measures across domains vary 
greatly, and a large number of studies did not report all the elements necessary to 
calculate standardized effect sizes. Moreover, some studies used self-reported outcomes 
or experienced treatment non-compliance, which can affect their internal validity. Few 
studies reported power analyses, and a number of the included experiments used 
convenience samples with unknown effects on their external validity. Second, because 
we count multiple outcome estimates from a single study separately, our review is prone 
to the “multiple comparison problem” (inflated Type 1 errors). Third, despite inclusion of 
six unpublished papers, selective publication of studies may have biased conclusions 
toward statistically significant effects. It is also possible that researchers themselves are 
biased in their selection of interventions to test. Lastly, not all tested interventions fit 
perfectly into our defined categories. Despite these limitations, we believe the scope and 
breadth of our analysis offer a useful perspective on the state of the evidence. 
Evidence for pro-environmental behavior change 
We found 72 studies that tested 160 interventions across our six domains (Table 1). 
Nearly all (96%) studies were conducted in the field, as opposed to a laboratory, and 
almost three-quarters (73%) measured observed, rather than self-reported, behavior. 
Sample sizes ranged from 23 to over 100,000, with a median size of 379 participants. The 
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majority of estimates addressed water use and transportation choices, while the fewest 
targeted land management and meat consumption (Figure 4). Norms were the most 
frequently affected contextual variable (48 times), followed by commitments (25), 
salience (11), defaults (8), priming (2), and messenger (1). The two traditional 
approaches—financial incentives and education—were targeted 29 and 36 times, 
respectively.  
Family planning 
The behavioral outcomes in this domain were measured by contraception use, fertility 
rate (actual births) and sexual activity (Table 1). Though tested only once, an intervention 
targeting norms showed a strong effect on family planning. Women offered contraception 
vouchers alone were 25% more likely to use contraception and 27% less likely to give 
birth than women who received the voucher in the presence of their husbands (Ashraf et 
al. 2014). A single study of the effect of salience, via daily reminders to use 
contraception, could not detect an effect on the rate of missed birth control pills 
compared to a control that received no reminder (Hou et al. 2010). 
More than two-thirds of tested interventions in our search were education, showing 
overall mixed results (a similar finding to the systematic review by Mwaikambo et al. 
(2011)). Financial incentives were tested in only one study, in which neither a credit for 
contraception nor a credit combined with family planning services showed an effect on 
contraception use compared to a control group that received neither (Desai and Tarozzi 
2011). 
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Land management 
Outcome measures in this domain were divided between adopting sustainable land 
management practices and committing resources towards conservation. A messenger 
intervention, which varied the gender of agricultural extension agents, increased adoption 
of sustainable agriculture by farmers when the gender of the agent matched that of the 
farmer (Kondylis et al. 2016). Switching the default cost-share from 0% to 100% in a 
conservation contracting auction increased the amount farmers were willing to pay by 9 
percentage points (Messer et al. 2016). In the same study, priming farmers to perceive a 
conservation practice as socially desirable increased the likelihood of bidding, but had no 
effect on the amount farmers were willing to pay. Commitments to dedicate land or time 
towards conservation had mixed results (Cobern et al. 1995; Lokhorst et al. 2009) and no 
effect was detected for a test of salience, which used message framing to engage farmers 
in conservation tillage (Andrews et al. 2013).  
Traditional interventions produced mixed findings. Payments for land conservation 
reduced the rate of deforestation by half compared to villages where there was no 
financial incentive for conservation (Jayachandran et al. 2016). But no effect was 
detected for providing payments in exchange for communal litter collection (Kerr et al. 
2012), nor for education about the benefits of conservation farming (Lokhorst et al. 
2009). 
Meat consumption 
Studies on meat consumption measured vegetarian meal purchases and self-reported 
changes in eating meat. Changing the default cafeteria menu to vegetarian-only, while 
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meat options remained available on a separate menu, increased the proportion of 
vegetarian meals ordered by 50% (Campbell-Arvai et al. 2014) and increased the odds of 
choosing vegetarian meals by a factor of 15 (Campbell-Arvai and Arvai 2015). 
Commitments to eat less meat reduced meat consumption by 15 percentage points 
compared to a group that received information alone (Loy et al. 2016).  
Of the three experiments that tested education interventions, one study found education 
resulted in a self-reported reduction of meat consumption, though the estimated effect 
was small (Monroe et al. 2015). Two studies could not detect a difference in the meat 
consumption of groups that received education and those that did not (Campbell-Arvai et 
al. 2014; Campbell-Arvai and Arvai 2015). 
Transportation choices 
Studies in this domain focused on three types of transportation behavior: driving 
efficiency, self-reported driving behavior, and public transportation use. Only one 
contextual intervention, which targeted salience, showed promise. Increasing the salience 
of environmental impacts increased the likelihood of improving driving efficiency 
compared to framing information in economic terms, although the sample size was 
notably small (n = 23) (Bolderdijk et al. 2013). Evidence on commitments was split: 
three studies found personal goals to use public transportation were effective (Bachman 
and Katzev 1982; Bamberg 2002; Taniguchi and Fujii 2007), and three studies did not 
detect effects (Jakobsson et al. 2002; Matthies et al. 2006; Eriksson et al. 2008). No 
effect was found for targeting social norms (Beale and Bonsall 2007; Yeomans and 
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Herberich 2014; Kormos et al. 2015), nor was there an effect when changing the default 
for purchasing bus tickets (Katzev and Bachman 1982).  
Most of the experimental literature within this domain focused on financial interventions 
(Figure 4). Direct monetary incentives, such as payments, charges and discounts, largely 
did not show an effect (Katzev and Bachman 1982; Jakobsson et al. 2002; Schall and 
Mohnen 2015). However, other financial incentives, including free bus tickets, travel 
vouchers, and prizes, encouraged sustainable transportation behavior (Katzev and 
Bachman 1982; Bachman and Katzev 1982; Matthies et al. 2006; Bamberg 2006; 
Thøgersen 2009; Yeomans and Herberich 2014; Schall and Mohnen 2015).  
Waste production 
This domain focused on behavioral outcomes related to waste production (ie reducing 
consumption) rather than waste disposal (but see Panel 1 on recycling). Results here offer 
evidence in favor of defaults and commitments to reduce food, paper, and plastic waste. 
Reducing the default plate size reduced food waste by 20% (Kallbekken and Sælen 2013) 
and switching default printer settings to double-sided reduced paper consumption at a 
university by 15% per day (Egebark and Ekström 2016). Commitments increased self-
reported food waste prevention behaviors in households (Schmidt 2016) and made 
shoppers 29% more likely to refuse plastic bags at a grocery store (Rubens et al. 2015). 
Mixed results were found for norms and salience. Communicating social norms reduced 
plastic bag use and buffet food waste (de Groot et al. 2013; Kallbekken and Sælen 2013), 
though no effect was detected on reducing paper waste (Rommel et al. 2015; Hamann et 
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al. 2015; Egebark and Ekström 2016). Salience showed an effect on refusing junk mail 
but not plastic bags (Rubens et al. 2015; Hamann et al. 2015). 
Traditional interventions showed promise in this domain. Financial incentives were 
effective in reducing junk mail and plastic bottle waste (Rommel et al. 2015; Santos and 
van der Linden 2016). Three of the four tested education interventions reduced waste (de 
Young et al. 1993; Rommel et al. 2015). 
Water use 
Commitments and norms showed promise for reducing water consumption by 
households, students, and hotel guests. Interventions employing commitments were 
effective nine of the ten times they were tested, particularly for encouraging hotel guests 
to reuse their towels (Baca-Motes et al. 2013; Terrier and Marfaing 2015a, b). Targeting 
norms by exposing participants to messages about the water-saving behavior of their 
peers also reduced water use, increased towel reuse, and increased participation in 
conservation programs (Schultz et al. 2008, 2014; Goldstein et al. 2008; Fielding et al. 
2013; Ferraro and Price 2013; Brent et al. 2015; Seyranian et al. 2015; Datta et al. 2015; 
Richetin et al. 2016). Increasing the salience of personal identity had mixed effects on 
water use (Dickerson et al. 1992; Baca-Motes et al. 2013; Seyranian et al. 2015), but 
simple reminders proved effective: households that attached water-use labels to showers 
and appliances reduced water use by 23% compared to those that received the same 
information in a leaflet (Kurz et al. 2005).  
Education and financial incentives showed mixed results, leading to lower water use in 
some cases, but not others (Geller et al. 1983; Thompson and Stoutemyer 1991; 
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Middlestadt et al. 2001; Kurz et al. 2005; Fielding et al. 2013; Ferraro and Price 2013; 
Seyranian et al. 2015; Terrier and Marfaing 2015a, b). 
What we know about contextual interventions  
Experimental evidence suggests that behavioral insights show promise for altering 
environmentally relevant behaviors (see Table 2). Interventions aimed at affecting norms 
or defaults produced consistent effects on behavior across multiple studies and domains. 
Several large-scale field experiments showed normative messages to reduce household 
water consumption by 2.5-7.7% compared to control groups (Ferraro and Price 2013; 
Brent et al. 2015; Datta et al. 2015). Switching default buffet plate size, printer settings, 
menu offerings, and cost-share amounts made it easier for individuals to act pro-
environmentally. 
The evidence on commitments and salience is less straightforward. Although 
commitments to reuse towels and to reduce waste and meat consumption were effective, 
no effect was found on reducing driving or adopting land conservation practices. 
Reminders to change behavior had an effect on water consumption but not on taking 
daily contraception or declining plastic bags at the supermarket. Reminders about 
financial benefits did not increase pro-environmental behavior more than facts alone, and 
framing behavior-change in financial terms actually reduced pro-environmental behavior 
compared to environmental framing and a control. Priming and messenger effects were 
each only tested in one study. 
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Contextual interventions in practice 
Overall, contextual interventions outperform education interventions. Six studies 
compare contextual interventions directly against an education intervention and a no-
intervention control and find that the contextual intervention produced the largest gain in 
pro-environmental behavior (Kurz et al. 2005; Ferraro and Price 2013; Campbell-Arvai et 
al. 2014; Schultz et al. 2014; Seyranian et al. 2015; Rommel et al. 2015). Financial 
incentives also outperform education interventions. Less evidence, however, can be 
gleaned from the relative impacts of contextual interventions compared to financial 
incentives. The two may be substitutes or they may be complementary. Appropriately 
tailored contextual interventions may optimize the acceptability and impact of financial 
incentives. 
Indeed, our findings showed some interventions work best in combination. Several 
family planning studies showed education interventions to be most effective when 
combined with health visits, vocational training, or social networking (Chong et al. 2013; 
Bandiera et al. 2015; Ahmed et al. 2015). Normative messages to promote tire inflation 
discouraged drivers when the service was free, but increased inflation rates (perhaps via 
social pressure) when an employee offered assistance (Yeomans and Herberich 2014). A 
number of studies combined multiple interventions into a single treatment, making it 
difficult to discern the causal effect of any one intervention or their interactions.  
The effectiveness of contextual interventions is often sensitive to conditions both internal 
to the decision-maker and specific to the external context. While targeting norms reduced 
water consumption, effects were repeatedly moderated by other factors, such as delivery 
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method, baseline water use and socioeconomic status. Norms also influenced family 
planning behavior, but gains in contraception use were offset by a negative effect on 
women’s subjective wellbeing. These caveats illustrate an important limitation of 
behavioral interventions: because their success is often conditional on prior beliefs, 
characteristics, and context, universally effective solutions are unlikely. Accounting for 
such complexity may require combinations of interventions that target both deliberative 
and subconscious thought to change behavior (van der Linden 2013). 
Future research and program design 
Our review identified four areas where more research could yield policy guidance for 
encouraging pro-environmental behavior change. 
1. Test interventions in domains that are most impactful on the environment. 
Meat consumption, unsustainable land management, and population growth put 
significant stress on the environment (Wynes and Nicholas 2017), yet we could find only 
four, seven, and nine studies that tested behavior change in these respective domains. 
More experimental research on decreasing meat consumption, for example, could reduce 
the rate of land conversion (Foley et al. 2011), emissions of greenhouse gases (Garnett 
2011), and biodiversity loss across land and seascapes (Machovina et al. 2015). Future 
research should also target producer behavior. While financial incentives and regulation 
will remain important tools to influence corporate decisions, contextual interventions 
may encourage low-cost, potentially high-benefit changes that benefit the environment. 
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2. Test interventions that have not been well tested with respect to pro-environmental 
behaviors. 
More evidence on messenger effects could be useful to environmental programs and 
policymakers. Given the strength of these in influencing health behaviors and charitable 
donations (Durantini et al. 2006; Landry et al. 2006; Stock et al. 2007), these 
interventions may be important tools for conservation.  
3. Test interventions using adequately sized randomized controlled designs to better 
measure causal effects of contextual interventions relative to alternatives. 
Well-designed experiments allow us to determine a cause-and-effect relationship between 
interventions and desired environmental outcomes. Yet many pro-environmental 
behavior-change studies are poorly designed, lacking adequate controls and 
randomization (Frederiks et al. 2016). Fewer than 10% of the studies in our literature 
review explicitly discuss the statistical power of their results. Given that nearly a quarter 
of the studies we reviewed had a sample size of fewer than 100 participants, it is likely 
that many results are underpowered. Studies with proper experimental design and 
sufficient sample sizes will allow us to draw stronger conclusions about the causal effects 
and magnitude of behavior-change interventions.  
4. Evaluate conditions, cost-effectiveness, and persistence of behavior-change 
interventions for policy implementation. 
In order to translate experimental evidence into environmental policy, more research is 
required to understand when certain interventions work, at what cost, and for how long. 
There are roadmaps for implementation (see Clayton et al. 2013; Schultz 2014; Reddy et 
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al. 2017), but little is known about the combinations and moderators of interventions that 
will determine their policy significance. A meta-analysis on commitments similarly 
highlights a lack of empirical evidence to explain why and under which conditions the 
intervention is effective (Lokhorst et al. 2013). While advocates of contextual 
interventions highlight their low cost (Sunstein 2013; Benartzi et al. 2017), only 15 of the 
72 studies in our review addressed the cost-effectiveness of the tested interventions. 
Twenty studies considered the duration of behavior change, but only nine measured the 
effect beyond six months. If the effects of promising interventions expire with the end of 
their implementation, there is little hope for addressing the scale of current environmental 
challenges (van der Linden 2015). Future experiments should prioritize evidence on the 
net value of the behavioral insight and persistence of behavior change.  
Looking ahead 
Behavioral insights show promise for sustainability, yet much work remains to make 
them actionable for environmental policy design and program implementation. We 
encourage collaboration between scholars and practitioners to embed tests of behavioral 
interventions within existing environmental programs. Such tests provide both 
generalizable scientific knowledge and specific applications that can be incorporated into 
scaled-up programs. A variety of scholar-practitioner collaborations are conducting such 
tests in poverty alleviation, public health, criminal justice, tax compliance, and education. 
Similar efforts have begun to address environmental challenges. Our review suggests 
there is both need and opportunity to build an evidence base of behavioral insights 
tailored to achieving sustainability goals.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Summary of included studies 
Domain Behavior Interventions Observed Studies Sample size 
Family 
planning 
Reduce fertility rate 4 75% 
9 73 – 6275 Reduce sexual activity 2 0% 
Use contraception 10 30% 
Land 
management 
Adopt conservation practices 5 40% 
7 58 – 5076 
Contribute resources to conservation 9 78% 
Meat 
consumption 
Choose climate-friendly protein 1 0% 
4 55 – 491 Eat vegetarian 4 100% 
Reduce meat consumption 1 0% 
Transportation 
choices 
Improve driving efficiency 7 100% 
16 23 – 700 Reduce driving 11 0% 
Use public transport 21 52% 
Waste 
production 
Reduce food waste 3 67% 
10 52 – 1302 Reduce paper waste 9 100% 
Reduce plastic waste 9 56% 
Water use 
Participate in conservation programs 3 100% 
26 40 – 106,669 Reduce water use 40 98% 
Reuse hotel towels 21 100% 
  Total 160 73% 72   
 
Notes: Behavior is the outcome variable used to measure the effect of an Intervention (see Figure 3). A 
single Study may test multiple interventions. Observed shows the proportion of interventions that are 
evaluated on an observed (vs. self-reported) behavior change. Sample size shows the lower and upper 
bound of the sample sizes for studies in that domain. 
  35 
Table 2. Balance of evidence to change environmentally significant behaviors  

















   
Education 
   
Financial 
   
Notes:  = family planning;  = land management;  = meat consumption;  = transportation 
choices;   = waste production;  = water use. Domains are allocated to a particular column 
according to the proportion of studies in that domain that measured a statistically significant effect of that 
intervention, as reported by the studies’ authors. Promising = 75% or more results found an effect; Mixed = 
less than 75% but more than zero results; No effect = none of the studies that tested that intervention 
detected an effect. See Figure 4 for the relative frequency of tested interventions within each domain. 
Emoji artwork is provided by EmojiOne and is licensed under CC-BY 4.0. 
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Panel 1. Behavioral evidence in recycling and energy use 
Recycling 
The experimental literature on recycling dates back to the 1980s. Today, waste 
management behaviors—recycling and not littering, in particular—have become so 
embedded in some countries that many consider them normative (Kinzig et al. 2013; 
Gould et al. 2016). 
Changing defaults, such as adding bins for recycled goods alongside trash cans and 
offering curbside pickup on the same day as trash pickup, has proven to encourage 
recycling. Messenger interventions, via neighbors, and commitments, via goal-setting, 
verbal promises, and public statements, have also increased recycling. Social norms, in 
the form of comparative feedback and visual presence of curbside pickup, promoted 
recycling behavior, but the effect was often mediated by personal values. Recent reviews 
suggest large gaps remain about the specific moderators and mechanisms that influence 
recycling behavior-change, particularly over the long term. 
Note: See reviews by Hornik et al. 1995; Porter et al. 1995; Schultz et al. 1995; 




Research on behavioral interventions for energy use began in the 1970s and focuses 
largely on reducing residential energy consumption and improving energy efficiency. 
Multiple meta-analyses and review articles synthesize the experimental evidence on 
energy behavior research. 
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Salience (frequent, in-home reminders of current use) and commitments (goals for 
reducing use) have made energy use feedback more effective in changing individual 
energy behavior. Defaults that automatically enroll customers in efficiency or green 
energy programs have also increased participation compared to opt-in programs. 
Comparison messages about neighbors’ energy use have been widely employed to target 
social norms and shown a range of treatment effects, though they can be less impactful 
than other contextual interventions in reducing energy use. Messenger effects warrant 
further research: engaging ‘block leaders’ in neighborhoods and model employees in 
offices show some evidence of influencing energy behavior, but the results and contexts 
are limited.  
Note: See reviews by Abrahamse et al. 2005; Faruqui et al. 2010; Osbaldiston and Schott 
2011; Abrahamse and Steg 2013; Davis et al. 2013; Delmas et al. 2013; Frederiks et al. 
2015; Karlin et al. 2015; Staddon et al. 2016. 




Figure 1. Examples of targeting contextual variables to increase pro-social and pro-environmental 
behavior. (a) Pledges elicit commitments that spur action to reduce energy use. (b) Automatically enrolling 
consumers in green energy programs increases participation compared to a default where people must opt-
in. (c) Health information is more effective when the messenger who is suggesting the behavior change is 
perceived as similar. (d) The behavior of peers and neighbors indicate social norms that promote recycling. 
Photo credits for Figure 1 
(a) Karen McKenny, South Burlington Energy Prize Competition  
(b) Brad Hess, Clínica de Familia La Romana 
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Figure 2. Interventions that target contextual variables to change behavior also include: (a) displays of 
healthy foods that prime shoppers to purchase more healthful products and (b) reminders and prompts make 
energy use and conservation salient. 
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Figure 3. Interventions targeting contextual and traditional variables to influence environmentally 
significant behavior. Variables are adapted from Dolan et al. (2012). 
 
 
Figure 4. Number of tested behavior-change interventions across six domains of environmentally impactful 
behavior. Column order is expressed in the key at the bottom of the chart. An empty column indicates we 
found no tested interventions targeting that contextual variable in that domain. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND BIODIVERSITY 
MANAGEMENT IN AGRICULTURAL LANDSCAPES 
Hilary Byerly1,2,*, Sara M. Kross3, Meredith T. Niles2,4, Brendan Fisher2,5 
 
Abstract 
The plot-level decisions of land managers (i.e. farmers, ranchers, and forest owners) 
influence landscape-scale environmental outcomes for biodiversity and ecosystem 
services. The impacts of their decisions often develop in complex, non-additive ways that 
unfold over time and space. Behavioral science offers insights into ways decision makers 
manage complexity, uncertainty, choice over time, and social influence. We review such 
insights to understand the plot-level conservation actions of farmers that impact 
biodiversity. To make these connections concrete, we provide a case study of the decision 
to adopt biodiversity management practices in the heavily cultivated region of the Central 
Valley, California, USA. We use results from a survey of 122 farmers in the region to test 
whether adoption is related to time horizons and social influence. We find farmers who 
are more sensitive to social influence are three times more likely to adopt practices that 
support biodiversity, including wildflowers, native grasses, cover crops, hedgerows, and 
wetlands. This relationship could have important implications for how plot-level 
decisions aggregate to landscape-scale outcomes. Finally, we offer four priorities for 
future research and program design to integrate behavioral science into biodiversity 
conservation in agricultural landscapes. By considering land managers’ plot-level 
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conservation decisions with the lens of behavioral science, we identify barriers and 
opportunities to influence those decisions. 
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Introduction 
The loss of biodiversity and the services it provides—especially pollination and pest 
control—have been highlighted by the European Union and the United States as among 
the most pressing concerns facing agricultural landscapes (European Commission 2017; 
IPBES 2018). This trend is largely the result of habitat loss and fragmentation, and 
compounded by chemical inputs, invasive species, and climate change (Butchart et al. 
2010). 
Strategies to improve biodiversity and ecosystem services in intensively farmed areas 
include encouraging natural or improved uncultivated areas along fields and riparian 
zones, altering the timing and techniques of cropping and tilling, and reducing pesticide 
use (Bommarco et al. 2013; Kovács-Hostyánszki et al. 2017). If these actions also 
support populations of beneficial organisms, then a farm may experience yield gains due 
to augmented provision of ecosystem services, such as pest control, soil retention, and 
pollination (Garibaldi et al. 2014). Such benefits may extend to nearby farms and 
contribute to broader landscape multifunctionality (Kremen & Merenlender 2018). 
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Despite potential private and public benefits, many farmers do not adopt practices that 
boost biodiversity (Lovell & Sullivan 2006). Providing habitat often comes at an 
opportunity cost to farmers: land that would otherwise generate profits may need to be 
managed less intensively. As a result, both the United States Department of Agriculture 
and the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy have enlisted a suite of policies 
and programs, spanning regulatory, incentive-based and educational approaches, to 
intervene and encourage farm-level biodiversity management. Desired activities include 
keeping or taking land out of production, improving uncultivated land by planting native 
species, and participating in government or nonprofit programs that provide information 
or financial incentives for such practices (Vaughan & Skinner 2008).  
Decisions to engage in these activities, however, are rarely straightforward. Farmers must 
evaluate complex and uncertain tradeoffs between private and social costs and benefits, 
now and into the future. A farmer deciding to provide patches of semi-natural habitat 
must weigh potential losses to her crops against the unknown probability of increasing 
bird and bee populations, and the services they provide, sometime in the future. She must 
incur upfront costs in time and money in hope of generating benefits for herself and for 
others who live nearby or even thousands of miles away, whose values of biodiversity 
may differ from her own.  
Behavioral science offers insights into ways decision makers manage complexity, risk 
and uncertainty, and changes over time. Rather than acting with unlimited cognitive 
capacity, people often rely on mental shortcuts, biases and contextual cues to guide their 
decision making (Kahneman 2003). People are also sensitive to the ways their behavior 
 44 
impacts and is perceived by others, so-called ‘social preferences’ (Fehr & Fischbacher 
2002). Importantly, these insights demonstrate how simple changes to the decision 
environment can influence behavior (Thaler 2018). Recognizing this, the field of 
behavioral science—and its more theory-based counterpart, behavioral economics—has 
made cost-effective contributions to improving individual and social welfare, such as 
increasing college enrollment and vaccination rates (Benartzi et al. 2017). 
The cognitive biases and social preferences that influence human behavior may help 
explain farmers’ plot-level decisions to support biodiversity. Observational studies of 
farmer behavior indicate that social norms and time horizons are associated with pro-
environmental actions (Prokopy et al. 2008; Reimer & Prokopy 2014; Niles et al. 2016). 
Yet, despite the overlap, we are not aware of any research that systematically connects 
these factors with the insights offered by behavioral science. A number of survey papers 
apply behavioral science to environmental and conservation issues (e.g., Brekke & 
Johansson-Stenman 2008; Shogren & Taylor 2008; Gsottbauer & Bergh 2010; Croson & 
Treich 2014; Cinner 2018), though none addresses decision making around land 
management to improve outcomes for biodiversity and ecosystem services. 
This paper adds to the existing literature by linking the field of behavioral science to the 
challenge of increasing biodiversity and ecosystem services in agricultural landscapes. 
The next section considers this challenge in the context of key insights gleaned over the 
past few decades of inquiry into human decision making. We apply insights from 
behavioral science to examine how four factors of influence —complexity and context-
dependence, uncertainty and risk, time discounting, and social preferences—may help 
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explain farmers’ biodiversity management decisions. Then, we present a case study on 
the role of time discounting and social preferences in the adoption of biodiversity 
management practices by farmers in central California, USA. Finally, we discuss how 
integrating behavioral science into future research might improve our understanding of 
farmer behavior and inform more effective landscape-scale conservation. While we focus 
on behaviors that encourage farm-level structural changes for biodiversity and the 
services it provides in high-income countries, we expect the discussion herein to be 
useful to other land management decisions and landscape-scale challenges. 
Behavioral science and biodiversity management in agricultural landscapes 
In the following subsections, we consider how farmers’ actions that impact biodiversity 
may be explained or influenced by insights from the field of behavioral science. This 
paper adapts the frameworks offered by Camerer et al. (2004) and Just (2014), organizing 
these insights into four factors of influence: 1) complexity and context-dependence; 2) 
uncertainty and risk; 3) time discounting; and 4) social preferences (Table 1). For each, 
we explain the behavioral factor and its components, make connections to farmers’ plot-
level management decisions, and discuss implications for biodiversity outcomes. 
Complexity & context-dependence 
Rather than being able to seamlessly navigate the complexity of the world, humans have 
limited cognitive capacity, or ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1955). As a result, peoples’ 
decisions often vary according to the context in which they are made. For example, the 
reference point from which one makes a guess or a bid influences its value (Kahneman et 
al. 1991). As does the order in which options are presented and the ways in which they 
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are framed (Tversky & Kahneman 1981; Shu et al. 2012). People become attached to a 
status quo and evaluate changes relative to that baseline, rather than considering absolute 
gains and losses. These “supposedly irrelevant factors” have shown to influence a range 
of important decisions, including saving for retirement and organ donation (Thaler 2016). 
Farmers make numerous management decisions amidst dynamic market, policy, social, 
and climatic conditions, such that the range of options and potential tradeoffs are large 
and complex. Farmers’ decisions to change management or enroll in programs that 
subsidize conservation practices can require considerable time and energy to search for 
information, evaluate alternatives, and estimate costs and benefits. These real and 
perceived transaction costs inhibit program participation in the E.U. and the U.S. 
(Mettepenningen et al. 2009; McCann & Claassen 2016; Palm-Forster et al. 2016). Habits 
and preferences for status quos are likely to influence management, but little is known 
about their importance in conservation practice adoption (Reimer & Prokopy 2014; 
Dayer et al. 2017). Farm-level decisions can also be sensitive to the context in which they 
are presented. Narrowly framing crop insurance as an investment (with a premium) that 
may produce a gain (the indemnity) can reduce purchasing compared to broadly framing 
insurance costs and payouts over all farm assets if some event occurs (Babcock 2015).  
Farmers managing for biodiversity and ecosystem services must weigh multiple options 
whose outcomes unfold in complex ways. Efforts to increase biodiversity may interact 
with other factors, such as farm or regional characteristics, that ultimately determine their 
effectiveness (Sardiñas & Kremen 2015; Heath et al. 2017). While the farm-level 
ecosystem service benefits derived from biodiversity are drivers of farmer adoption of 
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biodiversity-friendly practices (Kross et al. 2018), few studies have quantified these 
services at the farm scale. Farmers also tend to be time-scarce, further reducing their 
capacity to systematically assess how choices will play out on the landscape (Reimer & 
Prokopy 2014). As a result, farmers may avoid making changes in management that 
could benefit biodiversity when the process and outcomes are not straightforward, or 
when the status quo fosters inaction. Programs and policies designed to incentivize 
conservation may fall short if they do not account for the supposedly irrelevant factors 
that shape decisions. 
Uncertainty and risk 
Judgements and choices under risk and uncertainty can be subject to systematic errors. 
Accurate assessments of probabilities are difficult, even among trained statisticians 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1971). Instead, people overweight insights from small samples. 
They use rules-of-thumb, or ‘heuristics,’ to match uncertain situations with similar or 
salient scenarios in the mind (the representativeness heuristic and availability heuristic, 
respectively). This is especially the case in “low-validity environments”, which are 
highly uncertain and unpredictable (Kahneman 2011). Rather than exhibiting consistent 
risk preferences (i.e. being risk-loving or risk-averse), people’s choices are again 
sensitive to a reference point (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). Potential losses below this 
reference point hurt more than equivalent potential gains, called ‘loss aversion.’ As a 
result, people are often willing to take riskier gambles to avoid losses than they would to 
achieve gains. 
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The inherent uncertainty and risk in farming motivated a large body of work studying 
farmers’ responses to changes in yields and prices, which contributed to early 
foundations of behavioral science (Carter 2016). More recent studies have focused on 
risk and uncertainty related to climate change, showing that high levels of uncertainty 
dissuade farmers from adapting to changing weather patterns (Morton et al. 2017) and 
that farmers often perceive climate change risk to be greater than potential climate 
change benefits (Niles et al. 2013). Past experiences or stories of other farmers, such as 
crop losses from extreme weather events, serve as influential reference points for 
evaluating uncertainty and risk (Marx et al. 2007; Tonsor 2018). Loss aversion in risky 
decisions explains the failure of many farmers to adopt technologies that generate higher 
average profits but may increase losses on occasion (Bougherara et al. 2017; Du et al. 
2017). 
For farmers deciding how much cost to incur for future or public benefits of biodiversity, 
they must estimate the risks of changing practices against the likelihood of achieving 
gains, given varying levels of uncertainty. Yet any change in biodiversity may be 
perceived as stochastic, since only a fraction of that outcome can be attributed to the 
actions of one land manager (Hanley et al. 2012). This unpredictability is compounded by 
scientific uncertainty; even experts do not agree on the most effective strategies for 
conserving biodiversity in agricultural landscapes (Fischer et al. 2008). Such uncertainty 
may dissuade farmers from making any changes that could benefit biodiversity. Where 
outcomes are more probabilistic, farmers may instead rely on recent events or familiar 
stories to guide their assessments. Increasing biodiversity may increase risks of certain 
ecosystem disservices, such as crop destruction and disease (Jacobson et al. 2003; Zhang 
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et al. 2007). If potential losses loom large, farmers may fail to adopt biodiversity 
management practices that have private and social benefits because they are more risk 
averse over gains than they ‘should’ be. 
Time discounting 
People tend to discount the future and view time inconsistently. Immediate gains are 
worth more than those expected at some future time period. In part, this is because events 
that are far off in time are abstract or ‘psychologically distant’ (Trope et al. 2007). 
Moreover, the difference between receiving some benefit today versus tomorrow is much 
greater than that equivalent one-day wait a year in the future (called ‘hyperbolic 
discounting’). Not only do people value the future less, but that when the future arrives, 
they tend to exert less self-control than predicted. This is because people tend to be 
biased towards the present, causing them to procrastinate costly behavior that will have 
future benefits, such as studying, dieting, or saving for the future (Madrian 2014). Failing 
to accurately predict how one will feel at some future time period (projection bias) and 
misremembering how one arrived at a decision (hindsight bias) obscure people’s abilities 
to make consistent choices over time (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham 1991; 
Loewenstein et al. 2003). 
Certain factors are likely to influence the rate at which farmers discount the future, 
including immediate need, financial or tenure security, and age. Farmers who do not own 
their land and landowners who lease to farmers must adjust their time horizons to the 
terms of their contracts, potentially interfering with adoption of conservation practices 
(Ranjan et al. 2019). Although older farmers are less likely to adopt best management 
 50 
practices, perhaps because of a shorter planning horizon (Baumgart-Getz et al. 2012), 
those with a successor to maintain farm management into the future are more likely to 
participate in agri-environmental schemes (Lastra-Bravo et al. 2015). A review paper on 
farmer decision making conducted by Niles and colleagues (in preparation) found a wide 
range of discount rates used by researchers with often arbitrary or missing justification. 
Inconsistent time preferences may interfere with farmers acting in their own self-interest. 
Some farmers want or intend to adopt practices, but when the time comes to do so, the 
upfront time costs overwhelm the highly discounted future benefits of those practices 
(Duflo et al. 2011). This could explain evidence that farmers’ intentions to adopt climate 
mitigation and adaptation practices differ considerably from actual adoption (Niles et al. 
2016). 
Like climate change mitigation, the benefits of management changes for biodiversity are 
often distant in time and space. The impacts of many land management practices unfold 
over long time scales that conflict with the upfront costs and benefits associated with 
ecosystem change (Wilson et al. 2016). Planting flower strips and hedgerows to attract 
native pollinators, for example, requires four to seven years before yield benefits offset 
establishment costs (Kovács-Hostyánszki et al. 2017). This temporal disconnect between 
biodiversity actions and impacts may be compounded when farmers do not own the land 
they cultivate or have a successor to continue a legacy (Lastra-Bravo et al. 2015; Ranjan 
et al. 2019). Farmers’ actions to manage for biodiversity are likely to take time to 
produce beneficial outcomes. This makes private costs particularly difficult to justify in 




Social scientists have a long history studying the roles of social norms and cooperation in 
influencing behavior, including in land management (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 2000). 
Behavioral economists have incorporated these insights to explain deviations from 
expectations of self-interest and measured their effects on economic behavior. In doing 
so, they have identified the contributions of altruism, fairness, reciprocity, and social 
norms to observed behaviors (Fehr & Fischbacher 2002; Hoff & Stiglitz 2016). Further, 
this research has used experimental methods to estimate how much these social 
preferences matter in certain decisions and contexts (Abrahamse & Steg 2013). Studies 
show that providing information about the expectations and behavior of others, making 
one’s behavior observable to others, and selecting specific messengers to deliver 
information can change the actions people take (Cialdini 2003; Landry et al. 2006; Yoeli 
et al. 2013). These insights highlight the importance of social norms, image and 
reputation, and trust in influencing behavior.  
Social norms are associated with the management practices farmers use and their 
willingness to adopt alternatives (Garbach & Morgan 2017; Hillis et al. 2017). The 
absence of widespread support for climate change policies among farmers may influence 
perceptions of norms and cooperation, suggesting, “If no one else is supporting this, why 
should I?” (Niles et al. 2016). This social influence, or sensitivity to the views and 
behavior of others, is also associated with the adoption and persistence of conservation 
activities (Prokopy et al., 2008; Dayer et al., 2017). Offering reputational benefits, such 
as publicizing good stewardship, can be important for conservation program participation 
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(Atari et al. 2009; Banerjee & Shogren 2012). Land managers are willing to coordinate 
on conservation action when group performance is rewarded (Parkhurst et al. 2002), 
although perceptions of fairness matter (Drechsler 2017). Conversely, empathy for others 
drives some farmers’ decisions to adopt conservation practices and share access to private 
land (Sheeder & Lynne 2011; Czap et al. 2015; Niles et al. 2017).  
As with other land management decisions, changes in on-farm biodiversity can influence 
costs and benefits incurred by neighboring parcels and communities near and far. This 
implies that there is an inherent social aspect to these decisions, both impacted by and 
impacting others (Sonter et al. 2017). In some regions, prevailing social norms may 
conflict with biodiversity goals, such as aesthetic preferences for manicured farms over 
the ‘messy’ look of natural areas (Dayer et al. 2017). Because biodiversity is maintained 
at large spatial scales, effectively increasing biodiversity in agricultural landscapes 
requires the action of many individual landowners, which leads to free-riding and 
concerns about fairness. While altruistic land managers may be willing to supply 
biodiversity without incentives, others will require reciprocity or recognition for their 
behavior. Yet biodiversity is a public good, contributions towards which may not be 
easily observed or measured. Where management actions are difficult to observe or take 
time to produce benefits, these social rewards will be challenging to provide.  
Farmers’ social preferences, as well as their time discounting, evaluation of risk and 
uncertainty, and reactions to complexity and context, have clear links to decisions about 
managing for biodiversity. Evidence from behavioral science and research on farmer 
decision making suggest these factors can be barriers to adopting practices that encourage 
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biodiversity and, ultimately, improving biodiversity outcomes on the landscape. To 
illustrate these ideas, we offer a case study of farm-level biodiversity management and 
test whether two behavioral factors—time discounting and social preferences—are 
associated with farmers’ adoption of practices that provide habitat and forage for 
pollinators and other wildlife. 
The role of time and social preferences in farm-level biodiversity management in 
California 
The Central Valley of California, USA is an intensively farmed region that is critically 
important for food production and to the state and national economies. More than 400 
crops are grown in California, worth more than $50 billion in 2017, and contributing 13% 
of all U.S. agricultural value (CDFA 2018). In this largely agricultural landscape, the 
biodiversity management of individual farmers can provide refuge and habitat for birds, 
bats, bees, and other species. Creating hedgerows along fields, for example, increases 
bird abundance and diversity (Heath et al. 2017). Other actions, such as retaining existing 
tree lines and riparian corridors, planting wildflower strips, and providing habitat for 
cavity-nesting species, increase landscape complexity and have positive effects on 
biodiversity and the services they provide (Kross et al. 2016). 
We examined farmers’ biodiversity management behavior in the Central Valley and the 
farm-level factors associated with that outcome. Specifically, we used results from a 
survey of farmers to test whether proxies for time discounting and social preferences are 
associated with adoption of on-farm practices that benefit biodiversity. We hypothesized 
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that farmers who have lower temporal discount rates and farmers who are more sensitive 
to social influence are more likely to adopt biodiversity management practices.  
Farmers’ time horizons may be sensitive to their tenure arrangements. Farmers who own 
the land they cultivate have incentive to invest in practices that may not show returns in 
the near term, thus lowering their discount rate (Soule et al. 2000). This position contrasts 
with that of renters and non-operating owners looking for returns over the short time 
frame of farmland leases (Ranjan et al. 2019). These lease terms, which are often only 
one year in the United States, create insecurity for both parties, thus reducing incentives 
to make investments in biodiversity practices that may disrupt the current year’s revenue.  
Social preferences include how sensitive people are to social influence: information from 
and about their peers. Since managing for biodiversity is a contribution to a public good, 
engaging with peers and trusting them for information may facilitate cooperation and 
reciprocity (Fehr & Fischbacher 2002). Conversely, farmers who draw more on personal 
observation and experts for information may make management decisions with greater 
consideration of private costs and benefits. 
To test the relationship between time and social preferences and biodiversity 
management, we used data from a survey of California farmers that assessed 
management practices and opinions of wildlife (see Table A1). A detailed description of 
the survey can be found in Kross et al. (2018), who found that farmers’ perceptions of 
bats and birds were correlated with the management practices they used to attract or deter 
wildlife. On average, women had more favorable opinions of wildlife than men, and 
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organic farmers viewed wildlife more positively than conventional farmers (Kross et al. 
2018). 
Methods 
The survey was mailed to 500 farmers randomly selected from the County Agricultural 
Commissioner’s Office registers in each of five counties in central California (Butte, 
Sacramento, Solano, Sutter and Yolo). An identical online version was also made 
available and post-hoc analysis showed no significant difference in responses between 
the two outreach methods (Kross et al. 2018). 
The survey asked farmers to report on their perceptions of the ecosystem services and 
disservices on the farm from perching birds, bats, and birds of prey. Farmers also 
reported on the use of common biodiversity management practices, as well as their source 
of information about such practices, their interest in having wildlife on their farm, and 
their participation in five major conservation programs: Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program (EQIP), Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Conservation 
Stewardship Program (CSP), Wetlands Reserve Easements (WRE), and Organic 
Certification. Farmers provided demographic information, including age, gender, 
education, percent income from farm, and farm role.  
We developed two proxy variables using survey responses to evaluate the role of time 
discounting and social preferences in biodiversity management (Table 2). Time 
discounting was represented by a farmer’s role on the property: whether he or she is the 
owner and/or the manager. Respondents who were both the owner and manager of the 
farm were considered to have a lower discount rate, while respondents who were either 
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the owner or the manager were expected to have a higher discount rate. Social 
preferences were measured by the value respondents placed on receiving information 
from their peers about wildlife and wildlife management. Farmers who responded that 
information from other landowners and growers is “very useful” were considered to be 
sensitive to social influence, while those who did not were considered less sensitive to 
social influence. The outcome measure we used is the number of biodiversity 
management practices farmers reported adopting, which included cover crops, 
hedgerows, native grasses, wetlands, wildflowers, or ‘other.’ 
To test whether differences in time discounting and social preferences are associated with 
biodiversity management, we used the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test, which 
accounts for the nonnormality of our outcome distribution and smaller sizes of our 
subgroups. We modeled the decision to adopt biodiversity management practices using 
ordinal logistic regression to better estimate this relationship and account for other 
factors. We included as covariates participation in government programs, interest in 
having wildlife on farm, proportion of income from farm, and farmers’ gender, age, and 
level of education. 
Results 
Our survey received 122 responses from farmers who are majority male (74%), at least 
60 years old (51%), have a college education (68%), and who rely on their farm for most 
of their income (mean = 65%, sd = 40%). About half of the sample have participated in at 
least one of the five major conservation programs listed in the survey (48%) and are very 
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interested in having wildlife on their farm (49%). Table A1 provides a complete list of 
variables and their distribution in the sample.  
Native grasses are the most commonly adopted biodiversity management practice, 
followed by cover crops, wildflowers, hedgerows, wetlands, and ‘other’ (Table 2). Those 
who selected ‘other’ indicated they adopted riparian buffers, ponds, conservation tillage, 
and rotational grazing. On average, farmers have adopted two biodiversity management 
practices (Figure 1), although 22% of all respondents have not adopted any practices.  
For our proxy variables, 76% were categorized as having a low discount rate and 36% 
were considered more social (Table 2). Figure 1 shows the distributions and median 
values of biodiversity management practices according to time discounting and social 
preferences. Mann-Whitney tests indicate farmers with more social preferences adopt 
more biodiversity management practices (W = 1007, p < 0.01), but we find no difference 
in management according to farmers’ time discounting (W = 1216, p = 0.64). 
An ordinal logistic regression model estimates that social preferences, participation in 
government programs, and interest in wildlife all predict the adoption of biodiversity 
management practices (Table 3). Farmers who are sensitive to social influence—highly 
valuing information from peers—are three times more likely to manage for biodiversity 
than those who are not, given that all other values in the model are held constant (OR = 
3.11, p = 0.01, 95% CI of OR 1.36 - 7.22). We do not observe a relationship between 
assumed discount rates—or farmers’ roles (e.g. manager, owner, both)—and biodiversity 
management (p = 0.74, 95% CI of OR 0.37 - 2.06). 
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Discussion 
We found evidence that social influence is correlated with biodiversity management on 
California farms. Farmers who highly value information from their peers are more likely 
to use practices that benefit biodiversity. The direction of the relationship is supported by 
behavioral science research on social preferences: as farmers communicate with each 
other they can share information about their contributions to a public good, which may 
increase cooperation (Banerjee et al. 2017), and improve reputation within groups that 
value those contributions (Banerjee & Shogren 2012). Other research in this region has 
also found peers to be an important source of information for farmers (Lubell et al. 2014; 
Garbach & Long 2017). 
The importance of social influence in biodiversity management has implications for the 
Central Valley landscape and, ultimately, the species and services that benefit from these 
practices. First, because encouraging on-farm biodiversity can deliver public benefits, 
evidence that social factors matter for decisions about managing for biodiversity suggests 
a sort of alignment between action and impact. If sharing occurs between farmers who 
are spatially proximate, this pattern could aggregate across the landscape to increase 
connectivity and biodiversity outcomes. Some biodiversity management practices, such 
as prairie strips, produce benefits that increase nonlinearly as more farmers adopt them 
(Schulte et al. 2017). Moreover, the positive relationship between social influence and 
adoption of biodiversity management practices indicates that, for the sampled population, 
there are pro-biodiversity social norms. This is promising for increasing biodiversity and 
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ecosystem services in this heavily cultivated region, since social norms are powerful 
behavior-change levers (Nyborg et al. 2016). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, participation in government programs and interest in wildlife are 
also positively associated with biodiversity management. The programs listed in the 
survey require an agreement or contract in which farmers promise to deliver some 
environmental action (Vaughan & Skinner 2008). If these actions are the adopted 
biodiversity management practices, then government programs may be delivering desired 
behaviors. The positive relationship between interest in wildlife and biodiversity 
management suggests that farmers in our sample are acting in accordance with their 
preferences. 
The failure to find a relationship between time discounting and biodiversity management 
could be because there is little temporal disconnect between the costs and benefits of 
these biodiversity management practices. In this case, those with higher discount rates 
still see the benefits of managing for biodiversity, implying that agricultural extension 
should not ignore managers and non-operating landowners. Perhaps more likely, the 
proxy of farm role may not sufficiently distinguish between short-run and long-run 
thinking or the effect may have been too small to detect given our sample size. If the 
renter and non-operating landowner respondents in our sample have long lease terms or 
legacy plans, they may have sufficient incentives to invest in biodiversity practices. Or if 
owners have different discount rates than managers, then the aggregation of the two could 
offset their effects. There are not enough managers and owners in our sample to test these 
 60 
groups individually. We are also unable to discern from this survey whether farmers 
display consistent time preferences. 
Integrating behavioral science into biodiversity conservation in agricultural 
landscapes 
Behavioral science shows how human behavior consistently defies traditional economic 
expectations, upon which many behavior-change interventions are based. Recognizing 
the importance of these factors offers new options the expand the toolbox for changing 
behavior. Indeed, we are beginning to see interest from environmental policymakers and 
researchers. The European Commission’s report on the Common Agricultural Policy 
(2017) explicitly calls out the role of behavioral factors, including cognitive biases and 
social influence, as relevant to addressing environmental challenges in agriculture and 
rural areas. Scientists are considering the role of cognitive biases in adaptive natural 
resource management and conservation planning (Iftekhar & Pannell 2015; Catalano et 
al. 2018). Drawing from the previous two sections, we suggest four avenues to focus 
future research on farmer behavior and agri-environmental program design regarding 
biodiversity management. 
Simplify complexity and carefully design decision contexts 
While biodiversity outcomes are inherently complex, recognizing and reducing the 
complexity of adopting beneficial management practices could encourage action. One 
strategy might be intentionally designing programs that recognize the way people 
evaluate options. The ‘choice architecture’ of a decision, including default settings, 
reference points, message framing and other features, influences the way options are 
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perceived and evaluated (Sunstein 2015). When possible, test how changes to these 
features change behavior, such as automatically selecting all conservation practices and 
asking farmers to deselect those they will not adopt. One such study found that changing 
the baseline cost-share contribution from 0 to 100% increased the amount farmers were 
willing to pay for conservation (Messer et al. 2016). 
Highlight success stories and curb loss aversion 
Scientific advances that generate consensus on the impacts of managing for biodiversity 
would reduce uncertainty that may be inhibiting adoption. Yet even known probabilities 
can be subsumed by vivid stories and the potential of losses (Tversky & Kahneman 1974; 
Kahneman & Tversky 1984). Employing narratives to communicate science may help 
convey the benefits of increasing on-farm biodiversity (Martinez-Conde & Macknik 
2017). For example, translating statistical information on climate risk and uncertainty 
into concrete experiences increased farmers’ understanding (Marx et al. 2007). Future 
research could explore which types of narratives are most compelling and how to best 
leverage them to facilitate understanding of biodiversity benefits. Further, framing these 
benefits as strategies for avoiding crop or profit losses, for example, by increasing 
resilience, may target a sensitivity to losses over gains. This may be an effective approach 
in cases where managing for biodiversity can be a strategy to reduce losses from climate 
change or invasive species (Fischer et al. 2006).  
Investigate time horizons and make it easy to follow through 
The temporal disconnect between the costs and benefits of land management that develop 
over long time scales will always work against nonmarket values of biodiversity. A better 
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understanding of time horizons, whether through tenure arrangements, legacy planning or 
other mechanisms that encourage long-run thinking, could help address this challenge. 
Results from our case study suggest no difference in biodiversity management between 
farmers who either manage or own their land, compared to those who do both. Perhaps 
time scales were not mismatched in this context. Still, we were unable to determine 
whether some farmers intended to adopt biodiversity management practices but had 
failed to follow-through, thus exhibiting present bias. Future research should explore 
whether and how much present bias might interfere with biodiversity management. For 
example, sending farmers simple reminder letters increased re-enrollment in the 
Conservation Reserve Program (Wallander et al. 2017). Reminders, commitments, and 
other efforts that make it easier to follow through with intentions may increase 
biodiversity management among interested farmers. 
Leverage social influence through peers and public recognition 
Social influence is a promising lever to influence farm management for biodiversity. 
Indeed, leveraging peer information and public recognition has increased contributions to 
public goods in other domains (Kraft-Todd et al. 2015). Information about neighbors’ 
conservation behavior increased spatial coordination of land management in laboratory 
experiments (Banerjee et al. 2014). Farmers in our case study were more likely to adopt 
biodiversity management practices if they leaned on their peers for information. Future 
research should employ experimental methods that might identify the causal effects of 
such information on management. While behavioral science theory and evidence from 
other domains suggest public recognition motivates pro-social behavior, more evidence 
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on land management decisions would be useful to programs that are already offering such 
incentives for participation.  
Looking ahead 
A first step to tackling this agenda is conducting surveys and qualitative research that 
incorporate a behavioral lens. These should ask questions that illuminate how behavioral 
factors influence decisions, such as barriers to biodiversity management and farmers’ 
time horizons. Results can inform experimental research that tests changes to decision 
environments and identifies the causal effects of factors on management behaviors. If we 
consider changes in land management as the product of a series of decisions that 
ultimately produce a difference on the landscape, those decisions may provide 
‘intervention points’ to better understand and influence behavior (Valatin et al. 2016). 
The Center for Behavioral and Agri-Environmental Research (CBEAR)—a consortium 
of major land grant and research universities—is conducting and funding field 
experiments in partnership with the United States Department of Agriculture, and the 
European Commission issued a Science and Policy Report considering the role of 
economic experiments in the Common Agricultural Policy (Colen et al. 2015). 
Of course, there are challenges and limitations. Many land management behaviors are 
unobservable to researchers and outcomes unfold over long time periods. It is also 
possible that decisions about land are so costly and connected to deeper processes that 
some behavioral insights are not relevant. They are not cheap, quick, or automatic 
‘System 1’ decisions that nudges often target (Kahneman 2003). Yet policymakers are 
looking to move beyond the ‘low-hanging fruit’ and are leveraging behavioral insights to 
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address more intractable challenges (Sanders et al. 2018). And while depth of experience 
and high stakes of farmers’ decisions may reduce susceptibility to biases, other profit-
driven firms can be subject to the behavioral factors discussed (Armstrong and Huck 
2010). 
Conclusion 
Increasingly, conservationists are looking to working lands to encourage and steward 
biodiversity and ecosystem services (Fischer et al. 2006; Kremen & Merenlender 2018). 
Farmers, ranchers, and forest landowners make decisions about the management of their 
properties that aggregate to broader, often non-linear impacts on the landscape. The 
cognitive biases and social preferences that influence human behavior may influence 
plot-level decisions to manage for biodiversity and inform more effective programs that 
deliver landscape-scale conservation.  
The factors discussed herein are inherent to the challenge of increasing biodiversity and 
other public goods from private lands. Complexity, uncertainty, risk, temporal lags, and 
social interactions may always complicate efforts to change land manager behavior. Yet 
we are gaining a better understanding of how people manage these factors and how they 
shape behavior. Bringing behavioral science into conservation research, programs and 
policies may help make progress towards addressing biodiversity loss and maintaining 
the services private lands provide to society. 
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Table 1. Aspects of behavioral science and their connection to farmers’ plot-level decisions to improve biodiversity. 
Behavioral 
factor 
Summary Related biases, effects and influences 
Barriers to farmers’ adoption 
of biodiversity management 
Examples of strategies to 





People struggle to evaluate 
complex options and are 
sensitive to the context 
(reference state) in which they 
make decisions. 
• Anchoring and adjustment 
• Status quo bias 
• Transaction utility 
• Mental accounting & choice 
bracketing 
• Endowment effect 
• Framing effects 
Complex systems and processes 
may dissuade action, as might a 
particular reference point or the 
way behavior change is framed. 
Changing the baseline cost-share 
contribution from 0 to 100% 
increased the amount farmers were 
willing to pay for conservation 
(Messer et al. 2016). 
Uncertainty 
and risk 
People use mental shortcuts to 
judge probabilities and 
evaluate risk relatively, 
weighting losses more than 
gains. 
• Law of small numbers 
• Availability and representativeness 
heuristics 
• Confirmation bias 
• Loss aversion 
High uncertainty and even small 
risks of losses may overwhelm 
potential benefits from 
biodiversity, especially if 
familiar stories serve as 
cautionary tales. 
Translating statistical information 
on climate risk and uncertainty 
into concrete experiences 
increased farmers’ understanding 
(Marx et al. 2007). 
Time 
discounting 
People tend to be farsighted 
when costs and benefits are 
incurred in the future but tend 
to overweight those incurred 
in the present. 
• Present bias 
• Procrastination 
• Projection & hindsight bias 
Up-front costs in time and 
money may dwarf long-term 
benefits of biodiversity 
management, even if farmers 
want or intend to make changes. 
Simple reminder letters increased 
re-enrollment in the Conservation 




People care the impacts of 
their actions and how they are 
perceived, as well as the 
behavior of others. 
• Altruism & impure altruism 
• Fairness 
• Reciprocity & cooperation 
• Messenger effect 
• Reputation & image 
• Social norms & influence 
Prevailing social norms or 
missing information about 
others’ contributions to 
biodiversity may reduce 
incentives to adopt beneficial 
management practices. 
Information about neighbors’ 
conservation behavior increases 
spatial coordination of land 





Table 2. Description of key variables and their summary statistics. A full description of all variables used 
in the model can be seen in Table A1. 





Number of practices 
adopteda 
Native grasses 47 
118 








Time horizon of the 
farmer based on farm 
role 
Low discount rate: farmer is 
both owner and manager 
76 
122 
High discount rate: farmer 




Sensitivity to social 
influence based on 
value of information 
from peers 
Social influence: high value 
of information from other 
landowners and growers 
36 
120 
Otherwise: less value on 
information from other 
landowners and growers 
64 
Note: aThe values of specific biodiversity management practices are shown here to provide descriptive 
statistics; the variable itself is simply the count of practices. Because farmers have adopted multiple 





Table 3. Model results from ordinal logistic regression. Dependent variable is number of biodiversity 
management practices adopted by farmers. Odds Ratio indicates a change in the proportional odds of 
adopting biodiversity management practices for a one-unit change in that variable, holding all other 
variables in the model constant. 
Variable Odds Ratio CI low CI high p value 
Low discount rate (both owner and manager) 0.87 0.37 2.06 0.74 
Social influence (high value info from peers) 3.11 1.36 7.22 0.01 
Program participation 2.29 1.07 4.95 0.03 
Interest in wildlife 7.95 3.54 18.74 <0.01 
Dependency on farm income 1.00 0.99 1.01 0.52 
Age (60 or older) 1.21 0.57 2.59 0.62 
Female 1.08 0.46 2.55 0.85 
College education 0.70 0.23 2.14 0.53 
Graduate education 1.20 0.57 2.52 0.63 
Note: Odds Ratio is the exponentiated coefficient from the ordinal logistic regression model. 











Fig 1. Distribution of biodiversity management practices in California survey sample according to time and social preferences. Biodiversity 
management practices include wildflowers, native grasses, cover crops, hedgerows, wetlands, and ‘other’. The solid gray lines on each graph represent 
the median value for the sample (two practices). The dashed and dotted lines represent the median values for the groups matching that color in the plot 








Table A1. Description of variables and their summary statistics. 





Number of practices 
adopteda 
Native grasses 47 
118 








Time horizon of the 
farmer based on farm 
role 
Low discount rate: farmer is both 
owner and manager 
76 
122 
High discount rate: farmer is either 




Sensitivity to social 
influence based on value 
of information from 
peers 
More social: highly values 




Less social: less value on information 




Currently or previously 
participated in 
government programs 
(EQIP, CRP, CSP, 






Level of interest in 
having wildlife habitat 
on land 
Very interested 49 
120 
Somewhat/Not interested or Unsure 51 
Age Age of farmer 
60 years old and older 51 
121 
Under 60 years old 49 





Level of education 
received 
High school 9 
117 College 68 
Graduate school 23 
Farm 
dependence 
Percent of income that 
comes from farm 
 65 (40)† 120 
Note: aThe values of specific biodiversity management practices are shown here to provide descriptive 
statistics; the variable itself is simply the count of practices. Because farmers have adopted multiple 
practices, the percentages do not sum to 100. †Mean (standard deviation). 
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Table A2. Ordinal logistic regression model results. Coefficients represent the change in the proportional 
log odds of the adoption of management practices given a one-unit change in the independent variable, 
holding all other variables constant. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Adoption of biodiversity management practices 
Low discount rate (both owner and manager) -0.14 
 (0.44) 
Social influence (high value info from peers) 1.13*** 
 (0.42) 
Program participation 0.83** 
 (0.39) 
Interest in wildlife 2.07*** 
 (0.42) 
Dependency on farm income -0.003 
 (0.005) 




College education -0.35 
 (0.56) 
Graduate education 0.18 
 (0.38) 
Observations 103 






CHAPTER THREE: DO FOREST OWNERS RESPOND TO PEERS OR 
PEWEES? A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND 
SONGBIRD HABITAT CONSERVATION 
Hilary Byerly1,2,*, Anthony W. D’Amato1, Steve Hagenbuch3, Brendan Fisher2,4 
 
Abstract 
Working landscapes can provide biodiversity and ecosystem services. Many voluntary 
conservation programs ask those who manage working lands—farmers, ranchers, and 
forest landowners—to steward their resources in ways that maintain or increase these 
benefits. While research on landowners suggests the importance of social influence in 
management decisions, few studies have tested whether providing information about the 
behavior and opinions of others changes decisions related to private land and forest 
management, stewardship or conservation. Using a randomized controlled trial design, 
we mailed three versions of a solicitation letter for a bird habitat conservation program to 
967 individuals who manage forests to produce maple syrup. Maple producers who were 
offered recognition for participation were as likely to ask for more information about the 
program as those who received only a control message that described the program. 
Providing information about the participation of peers reduced the number of producers 
requesting information by 6 percentage points compared to the control. These unexpected 
results highlight the importance of context in using social influence to change land 
manager behavior. Findings are relevant to conservation researchers and practitioners, 
 80 
offering applications of behavioral science to improve biodiversity and ecosystem service 
outcomes on private lands. 
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Introduction 
Working landscapes—croplands, pastures, and managed forests—cover nearly half of the 
of the planet’s land surface (Foley et al. 2005). Though designated for production, they 
can deliver biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services when well managed 
(Kremen & Merenlender 2018). The decisions of farmers, ranchers, and forest 
landowners are often key to conservation success (Hilty & Merenlender 2003; Pasquini et 
al. 2010).  
Since many of the environmental benefits and costs of private land management extend 
beyond the parcel, government agencies and non-governmental organizations offer 
voluntary programs encouraging private land owners and managers to account for social 
impacts, including conservation outcomes. These programs are often designed to address 
the financial costs or information needs of changing management practices (Hanley et al. 
2012). Research on private land managers, however, has found a range of nonmonetary 
factors to influence management decisions.  
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Surveys of farmer and forest owner management behavior indicate the importance of 
social and psychological variables, including social and cultural norms, empathy, 
autonomy, and habit, among others (Prokopy et al. 2008; Mzoughi 2011; Huff et al. 
2015). While land managers who are environmentally conscious tend to be the most 
likely to engage with conservation programs, participation is also related to nonpecuniary 
external factors and program characteristics, including the participation of peers and the 
complexity and clarity of information (Davis & Fly 2010; Reimer & Prokopy 2014; 
Dayer et al. 2016). 
Behavioral science shows how leveraging social norms and other simple changes to 
program design can have policy-relevant effects on behavior (Madrian 2014; Kraft-Todd 
et al. 2015). Rather than restricting choice or changing financial incentives, researchers 
and program managers have altered how or when options are presented, by whom, and in 
what context. Often, these strategies employ social influence—leveraging people’s 
sensitivity to the opinions and behavior of their peers (Abrahamse & Steg 2013). These 
‘behavioral interventions’ have produced gains in a range of pro-social and pro-
environmental individual behaviors, yet there have been few applications to decisions 
about land and natural resource management (Byerly et al. 2018). Behavioral strategies 
are often low-cost and preserve freedom of choice, making them well suited for stretched 
conservation budgets and property owners possibly resistant to mandates (Ferraro et al. 
2017). Applications of behavioral insights to land management decisions may offer new 
and essential policy options to achieve conservation goals (Reddy et al. 2017). 
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Understanding what influences private forest management decisions is critical for 
conservation outcomes. Here, we address two questions that bring behavioral science into 
conservation practice. First, what is the effect of a simple change in messaging on land 
managers’ decisions to engage in a conservation program? Second, can social influence 
produce more interest in conservation programs?  
To answer these questions, we conducted a field experiment that tested whether 
information about 1) the participation of peers or 2) public recognition influenced land 
managers’ interest in conservation. In partnership with two practitioner organizations, we 
mailed different versions of a solicitation letter for a habitat conservation program to 
forest landowners who produce maple syrup. We measured differences in requests for 
more information about the program across the two treatment groups and a control. 
 
In our study context—the Northern Forest of the United States, a highly forested region 
dominated by 1.7 million family forest ownerships (Butler et al. 2016)—management 
decisions are essential to maintaining biodiversity benefits and ecosystem services. Every 
year, neo-tropical migratory bird species, including those of conservation priority, move 
from their wintering grounds in Central and South America to breed in the Northern 
Forest (Goetz et al., 2014). Habitat suitability for these species is influenced by forest 
composition and structure (Thompson & Capen 1988; Bakermans et al. 2012). But for the 
first time in over a century, habitat availability is declining (Thompson et al. 2017). The 
region is also facing other large-scale environmental challenges, such as climate change 
and invasive pests, which threaten to reduce forest complexity (Foster et al. 2017). These 
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changes will be compounded, as compositional and structural diversity are important for 
the delivery of ecosystem services, including tree biomass production and soil carbon 
storage (Gamfeldt et al. 2013). A range of governmental and nongovernmental programs 
(e.g., Current Use, Forest Stewardship Program) seek to increase active forest 
management and stewardship actions that improve diversity in forest structure and 
species, yet drivers of and additional gains from participation are not well known (Ma et 
al. 2012).  
Leveraging social influence could be an effective strategy for engaging forest owners in 
conservation programs. Forest owners report peers as important sources of information 
about management decisions (Kittredge et al. 2013; Sagor & Becker 2014). Information 
about other landowners’ behavior is associated with participation in programs for 
endangered and invasive species (Sorice et al. 2011; Niemiec et al. 2016), wildfire 
mitigation (Fischer & Charnley 2012), and sustainable land management (Chen et al. 
2009; Kuhfuss et al. 2016). However, we are not aware of any studies that have measured 
a causal effect of social information on observed forest landowner behavior. 
By testing behavioral interventions in the context of land management we contribute 1) to 
the understanding of these strategies (i.e. can social influence affect land management 
decisions?) and 2) to the applicability of new policy tools to an important social dilemma 
(i.e. can behavioral insights help increase biodiversity conservation?). We also add to the 
scant literature on the social dimensions of maple sugaring—a $141 million industry 




We collaborated with Audubon Vermont and Vermont Maple Sugar Makers’ Association 
(VMSMA) to conduct a field experiment on songbird habitat conservation in the 
Northern Forest of Vermont. Vermont is the leading producer of maple syrup in the 
United States, averaging nearly 7.5 million liters annually from an estimated 37,800 
hectares of privately owned forest1 (USDA 2018). These production forests (called 
‘sugarbushes’) are often managed within larger parcels of forested land (Farrell 2013), 
which provide essential habitat for bird species that breed and nest in the region. 
The conservation program we used was a joint program developed by Audubon Vermont, 
VMSMA, and Vermont Department of Forests, Parks and Recreation. This program, 
called the Bird-Friendly Maple Project, invites producers to manage their sugarbush for 
multiple objectives in exchange for recognition that increases visibility and reputation. 
Participants agree to an inventory of bird habitat in their forest, minimize harvesting of 
trees during nesting season, and have a formal forest management plan that 
acknowledges bird habitat as a priority. Forest bird habitat for many target species of the 
program requires tree species diversity and complexity of forest structure. This 
management also has positive co-benefits on broader forest biodiversity and the delivery 
of ecosystem services (Gamfeldt et al. 2013; Doerfler et al. 2018).  
                                                 
 
1 Calculated from the USDA-reported 5,670,000 taps in Vermont in 2018 and 150 taps 
per hectare following the density measurements of Farrell (2013) 
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At the start of our study there were 27 producers in the Bird-Friendly Maple Project 
representing 2,412 hectares of forest land. Early efforts to recruit producers into the 
program included presentations at the Vermont Maple Conferences and outreach through 
VMSMA newsletters and email communications.  
Sample 
VMSMA provided a list of their membership, including mailing addresses and the size of 
the maple production operation (in membership categories based on number of taps). We 
included only members of VMSMA that were maple producers, had valid mailing 
addresses, and were not already part of the Bird-Friendly Maple Project. This resulted in 
a sample of 967 individuals, families and businesses. This list was merged with maple 
producers from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Organic 
INTEGRITY Database to determine which were certified organic (see Supporting 
Information for more on the data and matching process). 
Almost half of our sample (42%) had less than 1000 taps, which approximates to 7 
hectares or less of forestland in syrup production (Farrell 2013). Producers were located 
across the state, and 26 producers had a mailing address outside Vermont. Eleven percent 
of our sample was USDA certified organic, with the proportion of organic certification 
increasing with size of production.  
Experiment 
Using a randomized controlled design, we tested messaging interventions using social 
influence to elicit interest in the Bird-Friendly Maple Project. We incorporated our tests 
into three versions of a mailing to VMSMA members about the program (Table 1). 
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The mailings asked recipients if they would like to receive more information about the 
Bird-Friendly Maple Project, with an option to check “YES” or “NO”. Those who 
checked “YES” also provided an email address or phone number to indicate how they 
would like to be contacted. This request for information served as our behavioral 
outcome, a proxy for engagement in this conservation program. Similar designs have 
been used to experimentally test farmer engagement in conservation practices (Kuhfuss et 
al. 2016; Wallander et al. 2017), including using a request for information as the 
dependent variable (Andrews et al. 2013). 
The content of the mailings was designed in collaboration with Audubon Vermont and 
pre-tested on a small group prior to deployment. All mailings were sent first-class in 
envelopes with VMSMA logos to increase the likelihood of opening. 
All producers in our sample received a 6x9” envelope containing a promotional card 
(“Promotion”), a response card (“Response”), and a postage-paid envelope (Figure S1). 
The Promotion card displayed photos of forest-dwelling songbirds under the name of the 
program. On the back, there was a message requesting the producer to complete the 
enclosed survey and a brief list of benefits of program participation, all related to forest 
health and forest birds. The second, smaller Response card listed the name of the program 
on one side and a five-question survey on the other (see Survey, below), including the 
option to request more information. 
This baseline version acted as the control. Each treatment built on this version with short 
phrases in three locations in the mailing (Figure 1).  
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Treatment 1: Peer information 
This treatment highlighted the participation of other producers in the Bird-Friendly 
Maple Project. This provided a descriptive social norm by indicating how others are 
behaving. Such information signals which behaviors are common in a given situation and 
can lead people to follow suit (Cialdini et al. 1991). For example, hotel guests who 
learned of others' water conservation behavior were more likely to reuse their towels than 
those who learned only of the environmental benefits of towel reuse (Goldstein et al. 
2008). Similar applications of descriptive norms have shown to increase curbside 
recycling (Schultz 1999), household energy conservation (Allcott 2011), and voter 
turnout (Gerber et al. 2008). Such peer information has shown consistent effects on 
encouraging pro-environmental behavior (Farrow et al. 2017), even among people who 
rate normative information as the least motivating behavior-change lever (Nolan et al. 
2008). 
In addition to the text in the control version, this treatment included the statements, 
“Many of your fellow sugar makers are part of (the Bird-Friendly Maple Project)” and 
“Join dozens of Vermont sugar makers who are part of the program.” These statements 
were meant to demonstrate that other producers have made the commitment to manage 
their sugarbush in ways that benefit birds. Informal interviews with producers prior to 
designing the experiment indicated that other producers are sources of information. This 
is supported by survey evidence of maple producers (Murphy et al. 2012; Kuehn et al. 
2017). Thus, it was expected that producers receiving this messaging would be more 
 88 
likely to request more information about the Bird-Friendly Maple Project than those who 
received only information about the program. 
Treatment 2: Recognition 
This treatment made salient the recognition benefits of participating in the Bird-Friendly 
Maple Project. Public recognition makes one’s behavior known to or observable by 
others. This engages reputational concerns, as people are often motivated to maintain a 
positive image (Bénabou & Tirole 2006). As a behavioral intervention, it has shown to 
increase charitable donations (Ariely et al. 2009), work performance (Bradler et al. 2016), 
and residential energy conservation (Yoeli et al. 2013). People are repeatedly more 
willing to incur personal costs in time, money, and effort for a socially desirable cause 
when others are informed of their behavior (Kraft-Todd et al. 2015). 
This version of the mailing augmented the control with the statements, “Recognizing the 
stewardship of sugar makers through (the Bird-Friendly Maple Project)” and “Earn 
recognition and visibility for forest stewardship.” It also included an image of the 
certification sticker offered to participants, which says “Produced in Bird-friendly 
Habitats.” Audubon Vermont advertises these recognition benefits to attract producers to 
the Bird-Friendly Maple Project and other bird habitat conservation programs. We 
intended to test whether the explicit mention of those benefits would in fact increase 
interest in the program compared to information alone. Since this messaging highlighted 
how the program makes producers’ behavior observable by others, it was expected to 
elicit concerns around image and reputation. We expected that this treatment would 
increase interest in the Bird-Friendly Maple Project. 
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Assignment to treatment 
Maple producers were assigned to treatment conditions through block randomization on 
size of operation. This technique can increase precision in estimating treatment effects if 
the grouping variable predicts the outcome (Imbens & Rubin 2015). We suspected that 
producer size (number of taps) would be negatively correlated with our outcome measure 
for two reasons. First, larger producers are more likely to sell their syrup in bulk (Becot et 
al. 2015). These producers would be less likely to value the brand reputation and eco-
marketing to consumers offered by the Bird-Friendly Maple Project. Second, maple syrup 
sales are more likely to be the primary source of income for larger producers (Becot et al. 
2015). For them, business decisions are likely to be more profit-motivated than for 
smaller producers who have other income streams and smaller forests to manage. 
We stratified the sample into two blocks as in Snyder et al. (2018): less than 1000 taps 
and 1000 taps or more. The number of subjects in each treatment and the proportion that 
are certified organic is shown in Table 1. 
Drawing on a laboratory experiment that provided information about others’ land 
conservation behavior (Banerjee et al. 2014), which found a standardized effect size of 
0.23 on socially efficient land use decisions (Janusch et al. 2018), we expected to detect a 
small effect of our treatments. We hypothesized an effect size of 0.1 at α = 0.05 and n = 
967, giving us a power of 0.80. 
Survey 
While the primary objective of this study was to estimate treatment effects of social 
influence on a conservation behavior, we used this opportunity to collect information 
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about Vermont maple producers. We included a brief survey to capture more specific 
information on size (number of taps and number of acres) and tenure (number of years 
the sugarbush has been in operation). We also asked subjects about the future of their 
sugarbush (number of years it is expected to stay in operation) and their primary reason 
for producing maple syrup.  
Lastly, we provided an incentive of the chance to win $50 through a lottery to encourage 
responses to our mailing. A meta-analysis found that incentives increase response rates to 
mailed surveys (Edwards et al. 2005). Producers were provided with a postage-paid 
business reply envelope addressed to the University of Vermont. The data collection 
process began July 16, 2018. A reminder email was sent from VMSMA one month after 
the initial mailing. The final responses were received by September 31, 2018. 
Results 
A total of 177 producers responded to the mailing, an 18% response rate. This is within 
the range of similar studies of maple producers and farmers (10 - 27%) (Andrews et al. 
2013; Becot et al. 2015; Kuehn et al. 2017). On average, respondents had 1300 taps 
across sugarbushes of 20 hectares (Table 2), matching the size distribution of the total 
sample. Respondents had been producing maple syrup for an average of 30 years. 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) confirmed balance across treatments for number of acres 
(F = 0.59, p = 0.55) and tenure (F = 0.03, p = 0.97). The difference between number of 
taps was marginally significant (F = 2.51, p = 0.08), with those in the peer information 
treatment having more taps on average than producers in the other two conditions (995 
and 2201 taps difference of means, 95% CI, 245 to 4156 taps). 
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Enjoyment and income were the most frequently cited reasons for producing maple syrup 
(Figure 2). Regarding producers’ intentions for their operations, we found that 
respondents expect their forests to stay in production for an average of 38 more years (sd 
= 37 years). Of survey respondents, 17% indicated they expect or hope their forest to stay 
in production indefinitely, 10% did not know, and 18% replied that their sugarbush 
would no longer be in production in the next 10 years. Since the survey was completed 
after producers had been treated by the social messaging, responses to these subjective 
questions could have been influenced by the treatments. There was a marginally 
significant difference between treatments among producers who rated stewardship as 
their primary reason for sugaring (𝜒2(2, 177) = 4.92, p = 0.09) (Figure 2). We found no 
difference between the future outlooks of respondents in different treatments (F = 0.11, p 
= 0.9). 
Across all groups, the majority of those who replied to the mailing also requested more 
information about the Bird-Friendly Maple Project (86% of all returned Response cards). 
Twenty-four producers (2.5% of the full sample) completed the survey but opted not to 
receive more information. There is a marginally significant difference between responses 
to the mailing (requested information, responded but did not request information, and did 
not return Response card) between the treatment groups (𝜒2(4, 967) = 7.97, p = 0.09). 
Treatment effects 
Our primary outcome of interest was whether the request for information varied across 
treatment groups (Figure 3; Table 3). The request rate among those in the control group 
was 18.6%. Those who received information about the participation of their peers had a 
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request rate of 12.8%, a statistically significant decrease of 5.8 percentage points 
compared to the control (95% CI for difference of means, -11.4 to -0.2 percentage points, 
p = 0.04). Those who received information about the recognition benefits of the program 
had a request rate of 16.1%, a 2.5 percentage points decrease compared to the control 
(95% CI for difference of means, -3.4 to 8.3 percentage points), but this difference was 
not statistically significant (p = 0.41). 
To increase the precision of the estimated treatment effects on the decision to request 
more information, we fit a linear probability model and included as predictors organic 
certification and size. The outcome variable was equal to one if the producer requested 
more information about the program or zero, otherwise. We estimated the intent-to-treat 
effects since we do not know whether all participants received the treatments. 
These estimates are shown in Table 3, with full model results in Table S1. The values are 
similar to the differences observed without the regression. Producers who were informed 
about the participation of their peers, were 6.1 percentage points less likely to request 
information about the Bird-Friendly Maple Project than those who received only the 
control message (95% CI, -11.8 to -0.5 percentage points, p = 0.03). Again, we do not 
detect an effect of the recognition treatment on interest in the program compared to the 
Control (95% CI, -8.6 to 3.2 percentage points, p = 0.37). 
Discussion 
We tested whether simple changes to messaging that leverage social influence could 
change engagement in habitat conservation among forest landowners. By running a field 
experiment in partnership with a conservation organization, we offer evidence about 
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working lands managers’ behavior in a real-world context. Contrary to our expectations, 
providing information about the participation of peers reduced interest in the songbird 
habitat conservation program. This unexpected negative effect demonstrates the 
sensitivity of behavioral interventions to the context in which they are implemented. 
Instead of replicating positive effects of descriptive social norms on behavior (Kraft-
Todd et al. 2015; Farrow et al. 2017), we find things to be more complicated.  
We offer several explanations for this result. First, personal identity may have conflicted 
with the norm. Personal characteristics, such as political affiliations, can moderate the 
effects of social norms and other behavioral interventions (Costa & Kahn 2013; Trujillo-
Barrera et al. 2016). Many private land managers value their self-sufficiency and 
autonomy in management decisions (Howley 2015; Lequin et al. 2019). Maple 
producers’ sense of autonomy may have felt threatened by the social pressure message of 
the descriptive norm, thus producing a defiant ‘no’ (a response known as ‘psychological 
reactance’) (Steindl et al. 2015). Second, it is possible that the norm was not sufficiently 
common to motivate conformity. Although positive verbal quantifiers, such as ‘many,’ 
have shown to be effective in encouraging pro-environmental behaviors that are not done 
by a majority (Demarque et al. 2015), people often do not follow a minority norm 
(Sieverding et al. 2010; Mortensen et al. 2017). Third, perhaps the information that others 
were participating in the program and providing habitat caused some producers to free-
ride. Although information about the contributions of others often increases contributions 
to public goods (called ‘conditional cooperation’) (Frey & Meier 2004), the provision of 
habitat on working lands often comes at the opportunity cost of production. If producers 
felt that enough others were already supporting biodiversity, they may have decided to 
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avoid the costs associated with doing so themselves. Finally, the external peer pressure 
could have crowded out intrinsic motives (Bowles 2008). Producers may have been 
interested in the program but, when feeling extrinsic pressure to participate, they decided 
against getting involved.  
This result is supported by other studies that employed descriptive norms and failed to 
increase desirable social outcomes. Wallander et al. (2017) included information about 
other farmers’ program participation in mailings to farmers about the Conservation 
Reserve Program. While the letter itself increased enrollment, the effect was unchanged 
by the addition of social information. Efforts to increase tax payment compliance and 
401(k) contributions also found providing information about the behavior of others to 
have a negative effect on behavior (Beshears et al. 2015; John & Blume 2018). Together, 
these findings highlight the importance of exploring how norms operate across contexts, 
as results from previous studies may not hold for different populations or behaviors. 
We failed to detect an effect of providing recognition for conservation behavior on 
increased engagement with the program. Although there are studies showing that offering 
recognition or reputational benefits can increase participation in conservation (Atari et al. 
2009; Banerjee & Shogren 2012), other land managers do not report recognition as a 
compelling reason to engage in conservation (Nebel et al. 2017). Given the potential 
marketing benefits for producers who are recognized by the Bird-Friendly Maple Project, 
we find this result surprising. It is possible that the perceived recognition benefits were 
not obvious or strong enough to influence behavior, or contrarily, that such benefits were 
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implicitly offered to the Control group. It could also be that our study was underpowered 
to detect a difference between the two groups. 
By using the VMSMA member list, we estimate the sample average treatment effect. 
This estimate is internally valid, but we expect VMSMA members to be more informed 
and engaged than the remaining 500 to 2000 non-member maple producers in the state 
(Becot et al., 2015) and therefore potentially not externally valid. All of the studies of 
U.S. maple producers that we are aware of used maple industry membership 
organizations as their samples (Snyder et al., 2018; Kuehn et al., 2017; Becot et al., 
2015). As a result, there is little known about the number and demographics of non-
member producers.  
We also acknowledge the large number of non-respondents who may not have received 
the treatments. The relative proportion of responses that did not want more information 
compared to those that did suggests that producers who were not interested may not have 
responded at all. While we do not know how many of the non-responses did not receive 
or open the mailing, random assignment should have produced similar proportions across 
treatments. 
Lastly, although we offer evidence on an observed behavior, rather than an attitude or 
intention, the behavioral outcome we measure is cheap. Checking a box on a postcard is 
much less costly than changing forest management practices. However, 30 producers in 
our sample have scheduled appointments to enroll in the Bird-Friendly Maple Project 
since receiving this mailing. While we are unable to attribute this action to any one 
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treatment due to inconsistent follow-up, this experiment has produced real conservation 
action in the Northern Forest. 
Although the particular interventions in this study did not have a positive effect on 
stewardship, other behavioral interventions or different iterations of social messaging 
warrant future research. Highlighting stewardship in the recognition treatment may have 
primed producers to list stewardship as a reason for sugaring, suggesting further evidence 
that simple changes in messaging may influence behavior. Moreover, nearly 50% of all 
respondents indicated they produce syrup for enjoyment, with another 15-20% selecting 
stewardship or heritage. These are consistent with previous studies of maple producers 
(Murphy et al. 2012; Snyder et al. 2018). The high proportion of respondents who 
selected the non-monetary reasons supports the notion that working lands managers value 
more than profits, even recognizing that our respondents are not representative of all 
maple producers.  
Additionally, nearly a fifth of respondents indicated that their sugarbush would not be in 
production after 10 years. Since the average age of producers in this region is 61 years 
old (Kuehn et al. 2017), there is a risk that land transfers will remove forested land from 
maple production in favor of higher value uses. Engaging this population in conservation 
programs could have an important and lasting legacy on the forested landscape. 
In 2011, the United States maple industry had tapped only 0.4% of maple trees that are 
suitable for production, most of which are on private lands (Farrell and Chabot 2012). As 
the industry grows, expanding the extent of maple production could be good for 
environmental outcomes because it keeps the forest as forest, as opposed to other land 
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uses such as development. Despite a paucity of research linking maple production to 
biodiversity outcomes, there is evidence that less intensive production systems can be 
consistent with conservation goals (Clark & McLeman 2012). For producers who would 
or already are managing in ways that support biodiversity, behavioral interventions may 
‘nudge’ them to do more. 
The working landscape is a critical component of bird and biodiversity conservation in 
the Northern Forest. With 80% of the landscape in private ownership (Thompson et al. 
2017), sole reliance on protected areas and reserve lands is not a viable solution. 
Conservation programs that promote and support forest products industries and 
successfully engage forest owners are essential to maintaining vibrant ecological and 
human communities. 
Conclusion 
We conducted a field experiment that offers evidence that land managers’ engagement in 
conservation programs can be influenced by simple changes in messaging. Providing 
information that others are participating, however, had an unexpected negative effect on 
conservation behavior. This result highlights the importance of tailoring behavioral 
interventions to specific contexts and conducting future studies to build evidence on 
effective interventions and reasons for failure.  
Although we were unable to detect an effect of providing recognition on conservation 
behavior, future research should try again with larger samples or more meaningful 
treatments. Providing recognition for land stewardship is already a strategy used by farm 
and wildlife conservation initiatives, including state-funded agricultural programs and 
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bird-, pollinator-, and wildlife-friendly habitat programs. It is not clear what the causal 
effect of providing public recognition is on engaging land managers in conservation.  
Applying behavioral science to biodiversity conservation requires creative ways to test 
strategies and observe impacts. Unlike electricity use or spending habits, land 
management decisions are difficult to observe, infrequent, and require financial and time 
commitments. While this makes testing behavioral insights challenging, shifting these 
behaviors can have long term benefits on the provision of biodiversity and ecosystem 
services from working landscapes.   
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Table 1. Control and treatment groups 









“Many of your fellow sugar makers are part of…”  




“Recognizing the stewardship of sugar makers through…”  
323 135 12.1 
“Earn recognition and visibility for forest stewardship” 
N, total number of producers who received that version of the mailing; <1000 taps, number of producers 
within the total that were designated ‘small’ in block random assignment; % organic, proportion of sample 







Table 2. Descriptive statistics of survey respondents 
 Median Mean SD Min Max Observations 
Size       
Taps 1300 3241 5360 15 38,000 173 
Hectares 20 49 77 0.4 506 151 
Tenure (years)† 30 46 57 1 300 177 
SD, standard deviation; Observations vary due to incomplete survey responses. †Some respondents 





Table 3. Effects of social influence on requests for information about the conservation program 
 
Control Peer information Recognition 
Request rate 18.6 12.8 16.1 
95% CI 14.3 to 22.8 9.1 to 16.4 12.1 to 20.1 
Difference from control - -5.8* -2.5 
95% CI - -11.4 to -0.2 -8.3 to 3.4 
Regression-adjusted 
difference 
- -6.1* -2.7 
95% CI - -11.8 to -0.5 -8.6 to 3.2 
Note: CI, confidence interval; *difference between treatment and control is significant at p ≤ 0.05. 
Regression-adjusted difference represents the coefficient from the linear probability model, which includes 
organic certification and size as predictors, and CIs are calculated using standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity (see Supplementary Information for full model results).  
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Figures 
Figure 1. Promotional card sent to maple producers and variations by treatment. The reverse side included 








Figure 2. Survey responses of maple producers by treatment. Left: Primary reasons for producing maple 
syrup among survey respondents. The total share exceeds one because some producers selected more than 
one reason. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Right: Length of time producers expect their 










Appendix A. Organic data matching 
In order to determine which producers in our sample were certified organic, we used the 
following process. We accessed the USDA Organic INTEGRITY Database 
(https://organic.ams.usda.gov/Integrity) and filtered list by State = Vermont AND 
Certified Products = maple, yielding 253 results. This list was imported and combined 
with VMSMA list of producers using the R statistical software. The Organic list had only 
business names, while the VMSMA list had mostly individual names, so many could not 
be matched automatically. The combined list was exported to Microsoft Excel and sorted 
by address to look for matching addresses between businesses and individuals. Identical 
addresses were assigned a unique ID number to indicate they represent the same 
operation. This produced 96 matches between Organic producers and VMSMA members. 
Another 10 certified organic producers were found to be current members of the BFMP, 
so they were dropped from the list. Next, we conducted an internet search for the 
remaining 147 organic producers, as well as the 26 producers without Vermont mailing 
addresses. Using the Northeast Organic Farmers Association directory, business websites, 
and other online directories, we matched another 14 business names with individual 





Figure S1. Promotional card (top) and Response card (bottom). These versions were sent to those in the 
control group. Additional text in the treatments (see Table 1) was added to the right-hand side of each card, 
above ‘The Bird-Friendly Maple Project,’ and in one more bullet in the list on the Promotional card. 
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Table S1. Linear regression results 
Dependent variable: 
Requested more information 
Peer information  0.061*   (0.029) 
Recognition  0.027     (0.030) 
Organic certified  0.062     (0.045) 
Taps (1000-1999)  0.089     (0.064) 
Taps (2000-3999)  0.044     (0.056) 
Taps (4000-8999)  0.029     (0.052) 
Taps (9000-14,999)  0.005     (0.048) 
Taps (15,000-29,999)  0.005     (0.044) 
Taps (30,000+)  0.045     (0.038) 
Constant  0.156*   (0.028) 
The coefficients for each treatment show the regression-adjusted differences in request rate from the 
control condition. * p < 0.05; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: REFRAMING ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 
INCREASES CONTRIBUTIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
Hilary Byerly, Paul J. Ferraro, Tongzhe Li, Kent Messer, Collin Weigel 
 
Abstract 
Strong empirical evidence links human activities to global environmental change and 
demonstrates how human well-being is impacted by this change. This scientific evidence, 
however, is often not sufficient to motivate people to bear private costs for environmental 
protection. Instead, emotional appeals depicting personal stories of loss or risk seem to 
spark public interest and action for the environment. Despite this conventional wisdom, 
few studies provide causal evidence on whether and how much such stories induce 
people to take costly and observable, rather than hypothetical or self-reported, actions 
that yield environmental benefits. To estimate the behavioral effect of an emotional, 
personal narrative in comparison to scientific information, we conducted a field 
experiment with 1,239 adults who maintain a lawn or garden in a polluted urban 
watershed. Before expressing their willingness to pay for landscaping products that 
reduce nutrient runoff, participants read either an emotional, personal narrative with 
tenuous connections to nutrient pollution or a scientific description of nutrient pollution's 
impacts on ecosystems and surrounding communities. Although the emotional narrative 
had a weak scientific foundation and failed to characterize the scope of pollution damage, 
it increased the amount people offered to pay for pollution-reducing products by 11%, CI 
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95% [4%,18%]. This result is consistent with claims of tradeoffs between ensuring that 
messages are scientifically rigorous and that messages maximize environmental impacts. 
Introduction 
Scientific evidence for the contributions of human activities to environmental change and 
the subsequent consequences for human well-being has been well-documented by 
international scientific panels and assessments, such the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment 1, International Panel for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 2, and 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 3. In their reports, and in most of the articles 
that comprise their sources, information is provided in statistical and quantitative terms, 
describing impacts over large spatial and temporal scales and in probabilistic language. 
Scientists often seem to operate under the assumption that this deluge of scientific 
evidence will catalyze action to address the environmental challenges of our day. 
Instead, some of the most iconic shifts in environmental stewardship have appeared to 
occur not in response to novel scientific findings, but rather to media stories that 
engender concern and compassion. The publication of Silent Spring has been directly 
linked to stronger controls on the use of agricultural pesticides, despite awareness of the 
ecological impacts of pesticides within the scientific community for decades 4. Similarly, 
the death of Cecil, an African lion, rallied millions to advocate for species conservation, 
even though the effects of poaching on African wildlife have been widely published for 
years 5. 
Behavioral science offers insights into why narratives attract attention in ways that 
statistical information does not. Humans make decisions as if guided by two systems – 
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one fast, emotional and intuitive; the other slow, rational and cognitive 6. When decisions 
are made with frequency or under limited cognitive bandwidth, the fast-thinking system 
tends to dominate 7,8. In such cases, people rely on quick and simple rules, or heuristics, 
to guide behavior. Heuristics use selectively recalled experiences or emotional responses 
to ease the burden of evaluating information and making judgements 9. For example, 
perceptions of climate change are influenced by local weather, which is easily available 
in the mind, rather than data on global climate patterns, which is complex and abstract 10. 
These intuitive responses can be elicited by framing information in ways that make 
certain aspects salient 11. Narratives tend to be rich in imagery and emotionally engaging, 
qualities that innately appeal to intuitive thinking 12. 
Emotional, personal narratives in the context of charitable giving have been reported to 
affect behavior to a greater degree than scientific or statistical information. People are 
more willing to act on behalf of a single, identified victim than a larger number of 
statistical victims 13. This victim framing increases charitable donations compared to 
factual information about more systemic problems 14, and the addition of scientific 
research to emotional appeals does not change average donation amounts 15. An 
advertisement that evoked sadness increased donations to an environmental organization 
by 21-30%, compared to a non-emotional ad 16. 
Less clear is whether and how much emotional narratives are effective in changing 
individual behaviors that contribute to global environmental challenges and how they 
might be used by practitioners who otherwise rely on scientific information. 
Observational research suggests worry about climate change is positively associated with 
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risk perceptions, environmental policy support, and a stated willingness-to-pay for 
gasoline 17–19. A meta-analysis of factors related to climate change adaptation found a 
strong association with negative emotions but a weak relationship between behavior and 
knowledge 20. Yet, even in the field of climate change communication, which has been a 
focal point for psychology and behavioral science, there is little experimental evidence 
that connects emotion and framing with real, costly changes in pro-environmental 
behaviors 21.  
The reliance on observational studies and self-reported measures of attitudes, values and 
intentions makes it difficult to identify the nature and direction of the relationship 
between efforts to change behavior and the environmental outcomes that matter, 
especially when those measures do not reflect actual behavior 22. While there is some 
experimental evidence of framing effects on pro-environmental behavior, there is a 
paucity of studies with large samples 23. Underpowered empirical designs and publication 
biases against null effects has led to a proliferation of scientific publications with 
exaggerated claims about the magnitudes of causal relationships. Without more precise 
estimates of treatment effects, these results cannot justify actionable interventions in 
policy and practice. Given the discomfort that policymakers and scientists might have 
with more emotional and potentially less scientifically sound messaging, it is important to 
quantify how large the framing effect could be. This information is also critical for 
scientists across disciplines seeking causal evidence on the impact of narratives in 
communicating findings 24. 
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In order to address these gaps, we conducted a field experiment to test the effect of an 
emotional, personal narrative against scientific information on people’s willingness to 
take costly action to improve water quality in a polluted urban watershed. Using a design 
with real financial incentives and sample of 1,239 adults who maintain lawns or gardens, 
we elicited values for landscaping products that reduce nutrient pollution. Before 
expressing their values for these products, participants were randomly assigned to read 
one of two framing treatments: either an emotional, personal narrative with tenuous 
connections to nutrient pollution, or a scientific description of the impacts of nutrient 
pollution on ecosystems and surrounding communities. We estimated the effect of the 
framing treatment on participants’ willingness to pay for pollution-reducing products. We 
provide causal evidence of its magnitude on an observed behavior with real private costs 
and real private and public benefits. 
We also tested whether this effect was moderated by the participant's gender. Responses 
to framing and to science communication have shown to vary by individual 
characteristics, such as partisanship and worldviews 25,26. We selected this moderating 
variable based on evidence that women have been reported to be more sensitive to 
emotional content than men 27. 
Methods 
We tested the effect of framing on the amount adults in the Delaware River Basin who 
maintain lawns or gardens were willing to pay for landscaping products that reduce 
nutrient runoff. Urban watersheds are increasingly polluted by excess nutrients from 
private land management decisions 28. Household actions, such as fertilizing lawns, have 
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increased nitrogen and phosphorus runoff 29. The Delaware River Basin spans 13,539 
square miles from southern New York to the Delaware Bay and is home to more than 8 
million people who both rely on and impact the basin’s water quality 30.  
To obtain people’s values for nutrient runoff-reducing products, we chose a well-known 
method that gives participants a strong incentive to reveal their true values 31. A 
participant reveals the most she would be willing to pay for a product. Then the product 
price is randomly chosen (from a normal distribution around the product’s average price). 
If the participant’s revealed value for the product was more than the randomly drawn 
price, the participant buys the product for the drawn price; otherwise the participant does 
not get the product. Because the value revealed by the participant does not affect what 
price she pays, but rather only whether she receives the product or not, a participant can 
never do better than simply revealing their true value (i.e., truth telling is a weakly 
dominant strategy). Lying about their true values for the products could make the 
participants worse off if the random price chosen is above their revealed value (i.e., they 
cannot buy the product) but below their true value (i.e., they would have benefited from 
buying the product). The best strategy for participants was explained to them in an 
animated video. 
Experimental design 
Recruitment for the study occurred at thirteen locations and events in Delaware between 
April and July 2017. In order to participate, individuals were required to be at least 25 
years old and self-report maintaining a lawn or garden. Compensation for participation, 
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which took about 15 minutes, was $15, with which study participants were able to 
purchase one landscaping product. 
Participants (n = 1239) were provided electronic tablets with SoPHIE—Software 
Platform for Human Interaction Experiments—to engage with the experiment. After 
confirming eligibility, participants were shown a photo and a text block that framed the 
problem of nutrient pollution in one of two ways. These distinct message frames acted as 
the experimental treatment in this study (see Treatments, below).  
After receiving the treatments, participants watched a 5-minute video explaining how the 
price would be selected for a product, and the advantage of stating their true values for 
the landscaping products offered. Next, participants were shown, in random order, four 
landscaping products that reduce nutrient runoff: slow-release fertilizer, biochar, a soaker 
hose, and a soil test kit. The details and environmental benefits of each product, as well 
as a small photo, were provided. Participants were told that only one of the four products 
would be selected for potential purchase, but not until the participant had stated her 
willingness to pay for each product. Participants were instructed to treat each product 
purchase decision independently because only one would "count" (i.e., they were not 
constructing a portfolio of products; they would only go home with a maximum of one 
product). Yet they should take each decision equally seriously because they would not 
know, a priori, which decision would count.   
Participants set their value for each product at an amount between $0 and $15. After 
revealing their values for all four products, participants provided personal information, 
including age, gender, and zip code. Finally, participants were informed of the randomly 
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selected product and price. If this price was lower than their revealed value for that 
product, participants were given the product and their compensation minus the price. If 
the randomly selected price was higher than their revealed value, participants received 
the full $15 compensation and no product. 
Treatments 
Before revealing their values, participants were provided information that framed the 
problem of nutrient pollution. They were randomly assigned to see one of two versions, 
which are provided in Supplementary Information. 
Scientific Information: This version described the importance of the Delaware River 
Basin, statistics associated with its poor water quality, and impacts on ecosystems, 
humans, and other species. It was accompanied by a photo of dirty water running into a 
storm water drain. Content for this treatment was sourced from government agencies and 
local news sources. This version simulated the way experts—scientists and 
practitioners—communicate environmental problems.  
Emotional Narrative: This version told the story of an upstanding local resident who 
died from an illness contracted through contact with polluted bay water. It was 
accompanied by a photo of the deceased individual. Content for this treatment came from 
local news sources. It provided a specific, personal story meant to elicit emotion through 
vivid descriptions and imagery. Inclusion of the name and photo of a victim and eliciting 
sadness have both shown to increase charitable donations 16,32,33. However, the 
connection between the story and the problem of nutrient runoff was tenuous, which 
could have raised concerns about credibility. 
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Participants in both treatments were informed that nutrient pollution is caused in part by 
water running off residential lawns and gardens. Both texts concluded with the phrase, 
“By using bay friendly landscaping products, you can reduce the nutrient runoff from 
your property.” 
The average value for all products served as our outcome measure. Assuming participants 
followed the dominant strategy of revealing their true value for the landscaping products 
offered, this value is participants’ average willingness to pay for the impure public good 
of pollution-reducing products. We tested the null hypothesis that there is no difference in 
willingness to pay between the two framing treatments. To conduct a power analysis, we 
ran simulations based on data collected in an earlier experiment that used similar 
products and a similar elicitation procedure. The analysis indicated we could detect a 
main effect of 0.14 of the standard deviation given a sample size of 1200 participants 
(𝛼 = 0.05, 𝛽 = 0.80). We also tested whether the treatment effect was moderated by 
gender. 
To more precisely estimate the treatment effect of the emotional narrative on willingness 
to pay for pollution-reducing products, we used ordinary least-squares (OLS) linear 
regression. Since our dependent variable is a continuous value bounded by the minimum 
($0) and maximum ($15) a participant could offer to pay for a product, we also estimated 
a fractional generalized linear model to test the robustness of our OLS results. We 
specified our main and moderator analyses and pre-registered our study on Open Science 
Framework prior to examining the data and conducting the analysis herein 
(DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/XQCG4).  
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Another study from this experiment tested whether a default starting value of $15 
influenced participants’ values compared to a starting value of $0 (the ‘anchoring 
effect’). This manipulation was randomized separately from the framing treatments and is 
controlled for in the analysis.  
Results 
Participants were willing to pay an average of $7.10 (SD, $4.65) for the landscaping 
products offered (Table 1). A total of 737 participants (59%) purchased a product, having 
expressed a value more than the randomly selected price. 
Participants who read an emotional narrative were willing to pay more, on average, than 
those who read scientific information for all products (Table 1, Figure 1). Pooling values 
for all four products and accounting for covariates, we find that participants who read the 
emotional narrative were willing to pay $0.77, or 11%, more to reduce their 
environmental impact (95% CI [$0.27, $1.27], p < 0.01; Table 2). The effect is more than 
0.16 SD. OLS estimates are consistent with those from the fractional generalized linear 
model (see Supplementary Information). 
We did not detect an effect of gender on response to the emotional narrative (Table 2; 
Figure 2). 
Discussion 
Results from our experiment show that an emotional narrative can increase the amount 
people are willing to contribute to environmental quality. In comparison to scientific 
information about environmental damage, this emotional narrative caused people to bear 
 122 
additional private costs to reduce their impact on the environment. This effect of a simple 
change in framing adds to a growing body of research supporting calls that insights from 
behavioral science may offer a new toolkit to help address environmental challenges 34,35.  
The response to this particular emotional narrative could have been driven by a number 
of factors. The difference in willingness to pay may be the result of an intuitive response 
to the proportion of victims in the two treatments 36. For those who read the scientific 
information, the scale of the problem was perhaps so large—with millions affected by 
poor water quality—that any one effort to reduce nutrient pollution appeared negligible. 
Whereas those who read the emotional narrative, which described a single victim, may 
have felt their actions could make a difference in preventing the death of another 
individual in the future. Participants may have also reacted to the easy-to-understand 
terminology in the emotional narrative. As an example, people reduced beef consumption 
following newspaper articles describing an outbreak of “Mad Cow” disease, but not after 
articles used the scientific labels of the same disease 37. Emotional reactions, such as fear 
or sadness, may also have influenced behavior 38.  
We cannot—and did not endeavor to—identify the mechanisms that drove the observed 
effect. The specific words chosen to deliver each treatment and their combination may 
have prompted responses that are not generalizable. Rather than employing multiple 
treatment arms to explore these variations, we prioritized statistical power. Future 
research could investigate which aspects of this specific narrative and scientific 
information influenced behavior, as well as whether effects change with different 
products or environmental contexts. However, there is no “emotional recipe” to advance 
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sustainable behavior 21. Mimicking real-world communications can complement 
investigation into the psychological mechanisms that explain behavioral responses. 
Other important questions remain about how reframing environmental challenges might 
matter in practice. For one, we do not know whether the effect varied for people with 
heterogeneous environmental preferences, i.e. do appeals to emotion through narrative 
increase contributions at the extensive or intensive margin? Emotional appeals may be 
more effective at increasing pro-environmental behavior among people who are less 
concerned about the issues 16. We also do not know whether the observed effect will 
persist over time or if it is scalable. There is evidence that the behavior-change effects of 
emotional appeals can dissipate after immediate exposure 16. The attention and feelings 
that fuel the intuitive response to stories are difficult to sustain over the long term and for 
large numbers of victims 39. Future experiments might test whether reading an emotional 
narrative influences consumption decisions at later time periods. 
Evidence that emotional narratives influence behavior in science-based contexts has 
implications for how people understand and respond to complex problems. Memorable 
stories feed into the availability heuristic, which relies on easily recalled information 
when evaluating probabilities 9. If that information is not representative, people may 
under- or over-estimate the likelihood of some event (called ‘base rate neglect’). For 
example, a vivid story about an atypical individual who abused the social welfare system 
led to negative judgements of welfare recipients, while statistical information explaining 
average characteristics did not change opinions 40. Leveraging emotionally charged 
frames could also lead to non-optimizing behavior if people react more strongly in the 
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moment than they would after deliberation. Vivid and emotional framing of risk, such as 
protection from “terrorist attacks,” induced people to pay more for hypothetical travel 
insurance than for protection against “all possible causes” 41.  
Appeals to emotion through narrative, particularly in science-based contexts, might also 
have undesired effects. People can perceive them as manipulative, simplistic, misleading, 
or fatiguing 42. Hitching complex problems to single stories makes them vulnerable to 
debunking or misuse, as has happened when attributing isolated weather events to climate 
change 43. Given calls from within the Academy to “decode science to a narrative that 
generates feeling” 44, these side effects call for a better understanding. 
Lastly, we should consider the cost-benefit of employing such strategies. At face value, 
achieving a tenth of a standard deviation change in behavior at zero financial cost makes 
for an appealing policy tool. But there are nonmonetary costs to leveraging emotion and 
single stories. An emotional narrative may create negative utility by making people sad or 
unsettling environmental practitioners and scientists who doubt its credibility. Those 
costs should be considered against the benefits of the environmental action. There may 
also be costs in terms of longer-term sustainability of the intervention, once people 
realize how it is being used to influence their behavior. 
The complexity and psychological distance of global environmental challenges are at 
odds with the processes of everyday decision making. Reframing these problems using 
emotion and narrative can encourage people to make choices that are better for the 
environment. Yet, the range of unknowns and potential for unintended consequences 
warrant caution. Future research may fill knowledge gaps, but there are also ethical 
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questions. In the face of global environmental challenges that may threaten future 
prosperity, can harnessing people’s humanity be ethical if it aligns their individual 
actions with the interests of society, both current and future? 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of sample 
 Full Sample Scientific Information Emotional Narrative 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Value (all products, $)  7.10 4.65 6.86 4.62 7.33 4.67 
Fertilizer ($ value)  6.85 4.41 6.55 4.32 7.15 4.48 
Biochar ($ value)  6.99 4.60 6.72 4.62 7.27 4.57 
Soil test kit ($ value)  5.91 4.26 5.75 4.22 6.07 4.30 
Soaker hose ($ value)  8.63 4.89 8.41 4.90 8.86 4.88 
Age (years)  47.4 14.9 47.6 14.8 47.2 15.1 
Female (proportion)  0.55 — 0.58 — 0.52 — 
Observations (count)† 1239 — 616 — 623 — 
† Value (all products, $) includes the revealed values for all four products per person, thus increasing the 
number of observations (Full Sample = 4956, Scientific Information = 2464, Emotional Narrative = 2492). 
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Table 4 Effect of framing on willingness to pay for landscaping products that reduce nutrient runoff and 
whether effects vary by gender. The treatment effect of the emotional narrative is compared to scientific 
information. 
 
Main effect Gender 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Emotional 
narrative 
0.48* 0.77** 0.38 0.63 
 [0.03,0.92] [0.27,1.27] [-0.29,1.05] [-0.07,1.34] 
     
Female   0.48 0.44 
   [-0.16,1.11] [-0.17,1.04] 
     
Narrative X 
female 
  0.25 0.24 
   [-0.65,1.15] [-0.62,1.09] 
     
Constant 6.86 6.52 6.58 6.60 
     
Participant 
characteristics 
No Yes No Yes 
     
Session 
covariates 
No Yes No Yes 
Participants 1,239 1,239 1,239 1,239 
Observations in 
regression 
4,956 4,956 4,956 4,956 
Ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimation. Dependent variable is the value, in U.S. dollars, of all products. 
Columns 2 and 4 include controls for participant-level characteristics (gender, age, state of residence, and 
date and location of participation) and session covariates (additional treatments not in this study, product, 
and order in which products were presented). Columns 3-4 show results of moderator analysis. Standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level. 95% confidence intervals in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** 





Figure 1 Average values for landscaping products that reduce nutrient runoff. Error bars represent standard 





Figure 2 Effect of framing by gender on willingness to pay for landscaping products that reduce nutrient 




Table S1. Robustness checks for estimating the treatment effect of an emotional narrative on willingness to 
pay for landscaping products that reduce nutrient runoff. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Emotional 
narrative 
0.48* 0.74** 0.77 ** 0.05* 0.05* 
 (0.23) (0.27) (0.26) (0.02) (0.02) 
      
Participant 
characteristics  
No No Yes Yes Yes 
      
Session 
covariates  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4956 4956 4956 4956 4956 
Dependent variable is the value revealed by a participant in U.S. dollars (Columns 1-3) and proportion of 
the $15 maximum value (Columns 4-5), pooling all values on the four products offered. Columns 1-4 show 
results from ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimation. Column 5 shows results from a fractional generalized 
linear model. Participant characteristics include gender, age, state of residence, and date and location of 
participation. Session covariates include controls for additional treatments not in this study, product, and 
order products were presented. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.05, 





Figure S1.  Screenshots of the framing treatments participants received before expressing their values for 
landscaping products. Scientific information (top) and emotional narrative (bottom) frame the problem of 






Figure S2.  Screenshots of biochar (top) and slow-release fertilizer (bottom), two of the four products for 




Figure S3.  Screenshots of soaker hose (top) and soil test kit (bottom), two of the four products for which 




Evidence from these four studies demonstrates that decisions about land management can 
be explained and influenced by leveraging insights from behavioral science. Social 
influence can impact land manager behavior, but the strategy and context matter. Among 
California farmers, information from peers was positively related to adoption of 
biodiversity practices. In Vermont’s maple sugarbushes, information about peers had a 
negative effect on interest in biodiversity conservation. Information framing influences 
the costs people are willing to incur for water quality. These studies add to a nascent 
literature that integrates behavioral science and private land management while also 
establishing a need for further inquiry.  
The first chapter laid out a research agenda to apply behavioral insights to decisions that 
affect the environment: more research on promising strategies in important domains 
using large-scale field experiments. Chapter Two expanded that research agenda by 
suggesting strategies that seem especially relevant to the provision of public goods from 
private lands. Chapters Three and Four contributed evidence by testing those strategies 
on decisions related to land management. Future research should continue to test these 
and other strategies on private land decisions, but it should also do more. To what extent, 
under what conditions, and with what practical implications can behavioral science 
inform strategies to influence land management behavior? 
First, future studies should prioritize measures of persistence, spillover, robustness, and 
limits to behavior change that can help parameterize the effects of behaviorally informed 
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strategies. Second, future field experiments should be adequately powered to test whether 
and how effects are moderated by participant characteristics. Importantly, this would 
enable investigation into the distributional impacts of nudges. Poverty reduces cognitive 
bandwidth, making people of lower socio-economic status more likely to be susceptible 
to interventions that capitalize on cognitive biases and, perhaps, carry a greater burden of 
behavior change. Third, research should extrapolate observed effects to measure cost-
effectiveness, environmental impact, and—especially for land management—spatial 
interactions among landowners. Wildfire mitigation, invasive species control, habitat 
provision – these are spatially dependent public goods. One landowner’s management 
behavior can both impact and be impacted by those of her neighbors. Incorporating the 
effects of social influence or reference-dependent risk aversion into models of landowner 
behavior could help identify priority areas or owners to target interventions. 
This agenda should be pursued through applied research, through partnerships with 
organizations and agencies who are implementing behavior-change programs. 
Experimental studies should be paired with qualitative and survey research to design 
appropriate interventions and interpret results in context. 
Strategies from behavioral science are not alternatives to providing information, changing 
incentives, or enacting regulation. These conventional policy tools can make large and 
lasting gains in behavior change. They are necessary to address the scale and urgency of 
current global environmental challenges, such as climate change. But even a carbon tax 
or plastics ban will be established with particular default settings, framed using certain 
messaging, and adopted in a social context where concerns about cooperation and 
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fairness are inevitable. Small tweaks to how those kinds of interventions are developed 
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